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COST AND PROBABILITY BIASES IN SOCIAL PHOBIA: EVALUATING THEIR RELATION TO ATTENTION BIAS
AND TREATMENT OUTCOME

by

MARTHA R. CALAMARAS

Under the Direction of Page L. Anderson

ABSTRACT
Social phobia is maintained in part by judgmental biases concerning the probability and cost of
negative social events. One hypothesized mechanism of action of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for
anxiety disorders is its reduction in the exaggerated probabilities and costs associated with feared out‐
comes, termed the “cognitive mediation hypothesis” (Foa & Kozak, 1986). A number of studies have ex‐
amined the cognitive mediation hypothesis; some investigations find cost bias to be more important to
treatment outcome, whereas others find probability bias to be more important. However, methodologi‐
cal limitations of several of these studies leave open the possibility that changes in judgmental biases
are simply correlates or consequences of social anxiety reduction. Attentional processes, which mark the
first discrimination of incoming information, may serve as precursors to cognitive processes like proba‐
bility and cost estimates. Though intuitively linked, whether social phobics’ pattern of attending to ex‐

ternal threat cues is correlated with their appraisals of the cost and probability of negative events has
yet to be examined empirically. The current project examines cost and probability biases and their rela‐
tion to attention bias and treatment outcome in a randomized controlled trial of CBT for social phobia. It
was found that, contrary to hypotheses, greater attentional bias for threat in either direction (vigilance
or avoidance) did not predict higher cost and probability estimates. However, a significant relation was
observed between attentional vigilance and outcome probability estimates, such that greater vigilance
for threat predicted greater estimates of the likelihood that negative social events will occur. As hypoth‐
esized, early changes in cost and probability biases predicted later changes in social anxiety symptoms
(and not vice versa). Changes in probability estimates were a stronger predictor of treatment outcome
than changes in cost estimates. Broadly, findings provide support for the cognitive mediation hypothesis
of social phobia and point to both outcome cost and outcome probability as potential treatment mech‐
anisms. Findings are discussed in the context of extant theories of social phobia, and directions for fu‐
ture research are proposed.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Social phobia is a marked and persistent fear of exposure to unfamiliar people or possible scru‐
tiny by others in social or performance situations. Socially phobic individuals fear being negatively eval‐
uated and acting in a way that will be humiliating or embarrassing. Feared situations are typically avoid‐
ed or else endured with intense anxiety or distress. Fear of public speaking is the most commonly re‐
ported form of social anxiety in clinical samples (Furmark, Tillfors, Stattin, Ekselius, & Fredrikson, 2000);
one study found that 34% of adults in a community sample had substantial public speaking fears (Stein,
Torgrud, & Walker, 2000). Other examples of feared situations include conversing with others and eat‐
ing, drinking, or writing in front of other people. Individuals with social phobia, generalized subtype ex‐
hibit intense and pervasive fears across most social situations including, but not limited to, initiating or
maintaining conversations, dating, speaking to authority figures, and going to parties (APA, 2000). Data
from the U. S. National Comorbidity Survey Replication estimate lifetime prevalence at 12.1%, making
social phobia the fourth most common psychiatric disorder after specific phobia, major depressive dis‐
order, and alcohol abuse (Kessler et al., 2005). During any given year, social phobia is second in preva‐
lence only to specific phobia, affecting an estimated 6.8% of the population (Kessler, Chiu, Demler,
Merikangas, & Waters, 2005). Social phobia has an enormous impact on its sufferers; socially phobic
individuals have fewer years of education, are less likely to be married, are of a lower socioeconomic
status, and may use drugs or alcohol in an attempt to self‐medicate (Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, & Lie‐
bowitz, 1992; Craske, 1999; Ruscio et al., 2008; Stein & Kean, 2000).
1.1

Theoretical Models of Social Phobia
Theoretical models of anxiety (e.g., Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005) emphasize the

importance of maladaptive beliefs and biased cognitive processing in the etiology and maintenance of
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anxiety disorders. Specifically, anxious individuals tend to believe that negative events are extremely
likely to occur (i.e., probability bias), and that if such events were to occur, the consequences would be
awful or unbearable (i.e., cost bias). Foa and Kozak (1986), in their seminal work on emotional pro‐
cessing theory, argued that these two types of judgmental biases are involved in the maintenance of
anxiety disorders and that treatment ameliorates pathological anxiety, in part, by modifying these bias‐
es. Their hypothesis that cognitive behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders exerts its effects through
reduction in the exaggerated probabilities and costs associated with feared outcomes has been termed
the “cognitive mediation hypothesis.” Their theory further states that though overestimates in the cost
and probability of negative events are present across all anxiety disorders, they may be of differential
importance within specific anxiety disorders. For example, social phobia may be more distinguished by
exaggerated cost than probability because people with social phobia hold the belief that even minor
social disapproval (e.g., being turned down by a prospective date) is catastrophic.
Specific models (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) also implicate faulty threat
appraisals in the maintenance of social phobia. An assumption of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model is that
individuals with social phobia believe that they are in danger of behaving in an inept and unacceptable
fashion and that this behavior will result in disastrous consequences. According to this model, dysfunc‐
tional beliefs and assumptions, such as 1.) the belief that other people are holding them to a high stand‐
ard of performance (e.g., “I must not make a single mistake”); 2.) the belief that their social evaluation is
conditional upon their performance (e.g., “If I make a mistake, others will reject me”); and 3.) uncondi‐
tional negative beliefs about themselves (e.g., “I am inadequate”) give rise to negative cognitions about
the likelihood of social failure and the consequences of such failure (e.g., catastrophic embarrassment,
rejection, loss of status). According to Clark and Wells, these negative cognitions trigger a shift in atten‐
tional processes in which the person engages in detailed self‐monitoring during which he or she neglects
the processing of incoming external information and instead focuses on spontaneous, recurrent, and

3
excessively negative self‐images which he or she believes to be accurate. Because feared consequences
are believed to be both probable and costly, physiological arousal (e.g., sweating, trembling, shortness
of breath) is likely, and these interoceptive cues thus become the focus of the person’s attention. This
focused attention, in turn, makes physiological signs and symptoms of anxiety seem prominent and easi‐
ly discernible; indeed, socially anxious people may mistakenly assume that the audience sees what he or
she is feeling. In other words, they believe that their own internal impression of themselves as extreme‐
ly anxious is what the audience perceives as well. Thus, self‐focused attention exacerbates the experi‐
ence of social anxiety.
The belief that one is being perceived in a negative way often leads the socially anxious individ‐
ual to engage in compensatory strategies known as safety behaviors. These behaviors are intended to
reduce the likelihood of negative evaluation, and they often involve efforts to hide physiological signals
of anxiety (e.g., tightly gripping the podium or lectern to hide that one’s hands are shaking). The unin‐
tended consequence of safety behaviors is that they may actually draw more attention to one’s anxiety.
Another unintended and unfortunate consequence of safety behaviors is that they serve to maintain
social anxiety because, when disastrous consequences do not occur (as catastrophes typically do not),
the non‐catastrophic outcome is attributed to the safety behavior, rather than to the person’s own abili‐
ties or the lack of danger. Thus, safety behaviors prevent disconfirmation of negative cognitions while
reinforcing the maladaptive behavior.
Cognitive processing of the self and one’s performance does not end with the conclusion of the
social encounter, according to Clark and Wells (1995). It continues after the encounter and up until the
next one in the form of post‐event processing. Post‐event processing is a review (or post mortem) of the
negative elements of a social situation in which inadequacies, mistakes, imperfections, and negative
perceptions of the situation are exaggerated. According to Clark and Wells, the socially phobic individual
repeatedly considers and reconstructs his or her performance in a ruminative manner. Their reconstruc‐
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tion, however, is distorted by the biased nature of attentional and cognitive focus and is colored by im‐
pressions and images of oneself performing poorly with exaggerated anxiety, thereby strengthening so‐
cial anxiety‐relevant schema and contributing to the maintenance of the disorder.
Like Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive‐behavioral model of
social phobia emphasizes the importance of judgmental biases and biased attention. They suggest that
persons with social phobia experience fear in social situations because they assume that others are criti‐
cal and that negative evaluation is probable. Therefore, when in the presence of any person or group of
people, socially anxious individuals become vigilant for any information that might signal the realization
of their feared outcome (i.e., negative evaluation). To accomplish this, a person with social phobia first
forms a mental representation of him‐ or herself. This mental representation is an image of how the
person believes others see his or her behavior and appearance. It is usually a composite of his or her
general appearance, past negative experiences that are consistent with core beliefs and negative self‐
schemas, internal cues (e.g., proprioceptive information like sweating, blushing), and external cues (e.g.,
feedback from the audience like yawning, frowning). Attentional resources are then deployed to these
internal mental representations of the self as well as to any perceived threat in the social environment.
(Note that this means that in the presence of social‐evaluative threat, the socially anxious person’s at‐
tention is divided among the mental representation of the self, threat cues in the environment, and the
task at hand.) Socially anxious individuals will commonly detect negative environmental cues and dis‐
count any indicators of social success that may help disconfirm their pervasive negative beliefs (e.g., ze‐
roing in on the one audience member who is frowning and failing to notice the three audience members
who are smiling) because they are looking to find information consistent with their self‐appraisal.
Concurrent with the allocation of attentional resources to potential threat, the socially anxious
individual develops a prediction about the audience’s standard for his or her performance. It is the dis‐
crepancy between this expected standard and the mental representation of the self that is used to eval‐
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uate the likelihood of negative evaluation and consider the cost of the evaluation. If the individual be‐
lieves that he or she is unlikely to meet the expectations of the audience, he or she will be more likely to
experience anxiety and fear negative evaluation. Thus, according to the model, anxiety will be experi‐
enced to the extent that negative evaluation is seen as likely and costly. However, recent research (e.g.,
Fergus et al., 2009; Weeks, Heimberg, Rodebaugh, & Norton, 2008) has highlighted the role of social
scrutiny in general, including that which may result in positive evaluation from others. Accordingly, a
recently updated and extended cognitive‐behavioral model of social phobia (Heimberg, Brozovich, &
Rapee, 2010) has highlighted fear of positive evaluation as an additional cognitive component of social
phobia. Fear of positive evaluation pertains to the sense of dread associated with being evaluated favor‐
ably and publicly, which leads to direct social comparison of the self to others and therefore causes a
person to feel conspicuous and in the spotlight (see Heimberg et al., 2010 for a more detailed overview).
It should be noted that these processes do not operate in isolation; rather they interact in the
form of a positive feedback loop. Biased detection of audience behaviors indicative of social scrutiny
would likely result in greater focus on the internal representation of the self, as the representation is
based not on how one actually views oneself, but how the individual believes the audience views him or
her at any given moment. Also, socially anxious individuals overestimate the extent to which their so‐
matic symptoms of anxiety (e.g., blushing, sweating, stammering) are visible by others, which also af‐
fects the mental representation of the self as seen by the audience. In summary, according to the Rapee
and Heimberg (1997) model of social phobia, vigilance for internal and external threat cues augments
the socially anxious person’s evaluation of the probability of his or her feared outcome, exacerbates
state anxiety in the short‐term, and maintains social phobia in the long‐term.
Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive‐behavioral model of social phobia is similar to Clark and
Wells’ (1995) cognitive model in its emphasis on the individual’s focus on him‐ or herself (referred to as
self‐focused attention by Clark and Wells and mental representations of the self as seen by the audience
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by Rapee and Heimberg). Attention to threatening stimuli is also a key feature of both models of social
anxiety. Vigilance for threat cues in the environment, according to Rapee and Heimberg, is similar in
function to the vigilant internal focus described by Clark and Wells in that in each case, the socially anx‐
ious individual scans for information regarding the likelihood of negative outcomes. However, the mod‐
els diverge on the phenomenon of vigilance for threat in the external environment. Clark and Wells as‐
sert that socially anxious persons attend almost exclusively to internal cues and that internal self‐focus is
most important to the experience of anxiety and the poorer performance of socially anxious individuals.
In contrast, Rapee and Heimberg contend that, in addition to internal cues, socially anxious persons are
vigilant to threat cues in the external environment. Indeed, a recent meta‐analysis of the literature on
attention and anxiety found that anxious individuals, including those with social phobia, do exhibit relia‐
ble and robust vigilance for threat when data are aggregated across studies (Bar‐Haim, Lamy, Pergamin,
Bakermans‐Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). However, individual empirical studies of socially anx‐
ious samples suggest that threat vigilance is not uniformly evident (for a review, see Bögels & Mansell,
2004). Although most studies find that, on average, individuals with social phobia or symptoms show a
tendency to attend toward threat cues; (i.e., a vigilant bias; e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002;), other studies
show a tendency to attend away from threat cues (i.e., an avoidant bias; e.g., Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, &
Chen, 1999) or a tendency to initially attend to threat cues and later avoid; (i.e., a vigilant‐avoidant pat‐
tern of attention; e.g., Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006) or no bias at all (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997). Meth‐
odological differences across studies, including variations in task type (e.g., Stroop versus dot probe),
stimulus type (e.g., faces, words, household objects), and stimulus presentation duration offer one po‐
tential explanation for these mixed findings (Schultz & Heimberg, 2008). Another explanation is that
there are different types of attentional bias among socially anxious adults, with some individuals show‐
ing vigilance toward and others showing avoidance of socially threatening stimuli. Indeed, Calamaras,
Tone, and Anderson (2012) argued that social phobics may comprise two subgroups on the basis of the
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direction their attention bias (avoidant, vigilant) and that these subgroups change in different ways fol‐
lowing treatment. Price, Tone, and Anderson (2011) found that an avoidant bias at pretreatment was
associated with reduced treatment response to CBT for social phobia; Waters, Mogg, and Bradley (2012)
recently replicated this finding in a sample of children with a primary diagnosis of generalized anxiety
disorder or social phobia, providing further evidence for the utility of attention bias subtypes.
Theoretically, biased attention allocation may be linked to biased cognitive processing among
individuals with social phobia. Clark and Wells (1995) argue that excessive attention directed toward the
self may prevent individuals with social phobia from processing social cues and receiving accurate in‐
formation regarding social situations. Indeed, recent studies have found that probability and cost bias‐
es partially mediated the relation between mindfulness (which is negatively related to self‐focused at‐
tention) and social phobia symptoms using cross sectional (Schmertz, Masuda, & Anderson, 2012) and
longitudinal (Morgan et al., 2013) designs. Similar to Clark and Wells’ assumption that individuals with
social phobia believe that they are in danger of behaving in an inept and unacceptable fashion and that
this behavior will result in disastrous consequences, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) state that people with
social phobia have a response bias, or a consistent and natural characteristic tendency, to overestimate
the likelihood and consequences of negative evaluation. However, they also state that cost and proba‐
bility estimates are “based on preceding stages of the model” (p. 749), one of which is the preferential
allocation of attentional resources to internal and external indicators of negative evaluation. Heinrichs
and Hofmann (2001) also posit that biased attentional allocation is the pathway by which individuals
with social phobia inaccurately interpret social threat. The authors argue that because attention marks
the first discrimination of incoming information, attentional processes serve as precursors to cognitive
(interpretive and judgmental) processes, such as cost and probability biases, in social phobia. Intuitively,
one could see hypervigilance for threat leading directly to increased probability estimates (because one
is seeing any and all possible indicators of threat to the exclusion of neutral or positive stimuli). Alterna‐
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tively, individuals with high probability bias may be more attentionally avoidant so as to protect them‐
selves from attending to social cues that they view as having a high probability of being negative. Per‐
haps, since attention bias is hypothesized to play an important role in the etiology and maintenance of
social anxiety, there is a dose‐response relationship between attentional bias and social anxiety symp‐
toms and cognitions, such that greater attentional bias leads to more biased cognitions which, in turn,
lead to increased symptoms. This hypothesis is somewhat supported by the findings of a study by Pish‐
yar, Harris, and Menzies (2007), in which positive correlations were found between reductions in atten‐
tional vigilance and reductions in self‐report measures of social anxiety.
Though attentional biases have been found to occur extremely rapidly (e.g., 17 ms; Mogg &
Bradley, 2002), it is also true that the meaning assigned to a social situation influences attentional pro‐
cesses. For example, Mathews & Mackintosh (1998) suggested that a situation must first be interpreted
as a social threat before attentional processes can be dispatched accordingly. Accordingly, one could see
high cost estimates as leading to increased attentional avoidance as an effort to circumvent or prevent
the catastrophic cognitions that could be prompted by social threat cues. Thus attentional and judgmen‐
tal processes may occur in an interrelated, rather than linear sequence.
In spite of the strong theoretical and intuitive rationale, an as yet unasked question is whether
social phobics’ pattern of attending to external threat cues is related to their appraisals of the cost and
probability of negative events. The following sections first review the empirical literature on probability
and cost biases before turning to how the present study addresses this question.
1.2

Empirical Literature on Probability Bias
There is substantial empirical support for the presence of a bias regarding the probability of so‐

cial events in individuals with social phobia. In a nonclinical sample of undergraduate students, Smári,
Bjarnadottir, and Bragadottir (1998) found a significant positive correlation between social anxiety
symptoms and probability overestimates of severely negative social outcomes (e.g., “You will make a
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fool of yourself.”). Foa and colleauges (1996), comparing 15 individuals diagnosed with social phobia to
15 nonanxious controls, found that social phobics overestimated the probability of mild negative social
events (e.g., “Someone you know won’t say hello to you”) relative to nonanxious controls. McManus,
Clark, and Hackmann (2000) extended these findings by including an additional control group: partici‐
pants meeting criteria for another DSM‐IV anxiety disorder (e.g., obsessive compulsive disorder). The
authors found that participants with social phobia had significantly higher estimates of the probability of
both mildly and severely negative social events than did the nonanxious and non‐socially anxious control
groups. The one study that has examined probability of positive social events (Lucock & Salkovskis,
1998) found that, in addition to rating negative outcomes as more likely to occur than controls did, they
also rated positive social outcomes as less likely to occur. These three studies suggest that social phobia
is associated with biased probability estimates; however, they are limited by their reliance on self‐report
measures and hypothetical situations. Only one study (Andrews, Freed, & Teesson, 1994) used a behav‐
ioral assessment. In this study, participants diagnosed with social phobia were required to either speak
or eat in front of strangers and asked to rate the probability that they would feel “silly and embarrassed
and be noticed to be so by other people” at three time points: prior to entering the situation, while in
the situation, and after leaving the situation. Compared to nonanxious controls, individuals with social
phobia rated the likelihood of embarrassment significantly higher, and ratings made in anticipation were
consistently higher than ratings made either in the situation or after leaving it. In conclusion, research
has documented the presence of a pervasive bias regarding the probability of mildly negative, severely
negative, and positive social events in clinical and nonclinical socially anxious samples, using both self‐
report and behavioral methods.
1.3

Empirical Literature on Cost Bias
Theorists have argued that inflated probability estimates of the likelihood of negative social

events are unlikely to cause anxiety unless the negative social event is considered aversive or to have a
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negative consequence. That is, if an event is perceived as likely but not harmful, it will not be appraised
as threatening or anxiety provoking. Therefore, inflated cost estimates for negative social events have
been hypothesized to be the driving force behind social phobia fears (Foa & Kozak, 1986).
Smári et al. (1998) asked nonclinical participants to rate the severity of five negative social
events and found that cost estimates were significantly correlated with social anxiety symptoms. Uren,
Szabó, and Lovibond (2004) replicated these findings in a clinical sample and found that, compared to
nonanxious controls, the clinically socially anxious rated the negative social outcomes as more distress‐
ing, which the authors interpret as evidence of overestimates in the appraisal of the cost of the out‐
comes. Two other studies found evidence of cost bias in clinical participants when compared to nonanx‐
ious controls. One found overestimates in the cost of mildly negative social events (Foa et al, 1996), and
another found overestimates in both mildly and profoundly negative social events (McManus et al.,
2000). One limitation of these studies, however, is that they relied heavily on self‐report Likert/Likert‐
type measures.
Three studies (Stopa & Clark; 2000; Gilboa‐Schechtman, Franklin, & Foa, 2000; Wilson & Rapee,
2005) have used open‐ended assessments in an effort to clarify why individuals with social phobia per‐
ceive negative social events as more costly. Stopa and Clark (2000) asked individuals with social phobia
and nonanxious controls to interpret ambiguous (e.g., an audience member leaving in the middle of a
speech) and mildly negative social events. The authors found that individuals with social phobia were
more likely to generate negative and catastrophic explanations for events than controls. Gilboa‐
Schechtman, Franklin, and Foa (2000) had participants rate several dimensions of both positive and neg‐
ative social events and found that individuals with social phobia reported more physically and emotion‐
ally intense reactions, changes in self‐esteem, and longer reactions (i.e., 48 hours versus 2 hours) than
nonanxious controls. Similar results were found for positive events, which is consistent with the notion
that positive events can also be interpreted as threatening by people with social phobia because they
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increase standards for future performances (Wallace & Alden, 1995; Heimberg et al., 2010). Lastly, Wil‐
son and Rapee (2005) asked people diagnosed with social phobia and non‐socially anxious controls to
imagine themselves in a negative social situation (e.g., “You go to a party, and spend a lot of time stand‐
ing on your own”) and indicate their degree of belief in four interpretations of the situation. Results
showed that social anxiety was associated with the tendency to believe that negative social events
would result in negative evaluation by other people, indicate negative personal characteristics, and yield
adverse consequences in the long‐term future. In sum, structured and unstructured assessments have
been used to demonstrate that socially anxious individuals view both positive and negative social events
as more catastrophic than do nonanxious controls, providing reliable evidence for the presence of in‐
flated cost estimates in social phobia.
To review, the current research literature suggests that social phobia is associated with perva‐
sive biases concerning the probability and cost of social events. Evidence of attentional vigilance for ex‐
ternal cues indicative of social threat cues also has been demonstrated within socially phobic samples.
Extant models of social phobia provide a strong theoretical link between attentional and judgmental
biases; however these relations have yet to be examined empirically. The following sections provide an
overview of treatment interventions for social phobia, a review of the scientific literature examining cost
and probability biases in the context of treatment for social phobia, and culminate in the rationale for
the present proposal.
1.4

The Treatment of Social Phobia
The treatment of choice for social phobia is cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), which incorpo‐

rates various treatment components including exposure‐based strategies, cognitive restructuring, anxie‐
ty management training, and social skills training (Barlow et al, 2003; Rodebaugh et al, 2004).
Exposure refers to the repeated and systematic confrontation of feared stimuli and is consid‐
ered “an essential ingredient underlying efficacious psychological treatment for anxiety disorders”
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(Moscovitch, Antony, & Swinson, 2009, p. 461). Exposure therapy involves repeated confrontation of a
feared stimulus in the absence of a feared outcome, resulting in decrements in fear. Research on the
mechanisms of exposure therapy draws from the principles of operant and classical conditioning and
learning theory. More recently, the term extinction has been favored to refer to the decrease in re‐
sponding that occurs when the link between a feared stimulus (e.g., public speaking) and the fear re‐
sponse (e.g., anxiety regarding the likelihood of negative evaluation) is weakened. It is this uncoupling of
the feared stimulus and fear response that leads to extinction. Current theory suggests not that the fear
is completely eliminated, but rather that a new, more adaptive response (e.g., behavioral approach ra‐
ther than avoidance or the thought that public speaking is unlikely to lead to catastrophic outcomes) is
learned that comes to co‐exist in competition with the original fear. This process is known as safety
learning.
Exposure therapy may be done in a natural setting (in vivo), by imagination (in vitro), or through
the use of virtual technologies (in virtuo). Regardless of the route of administration, effective exposure
therapy must be repeated, prolonged, and controlled (Foa & Kozak, 1986). According to Foa and Kozak,
in order for fear reduction to occur: 1.) the fear memory must be activated (as measured by subjective
and physiological fear responses to the feared stimuli), and 2.) the encoding of new information incom‐
patible with the fear network must occur. The fear network typically includes overestimated probabili‐
ties about the likelihood that confronting feared stimuli will produce harmful consequences, as well as
catastrophic beliefs about how harmful those consequences will be. Anxious individuals also tend to be‐
lieve that their anxiety response will persist indefinitely, spiral out of control, and/or cause psychological
or physical harm. Experiencing information incompatible with feared beliefs should therefore promote
learning that the actual probability of feared consequences occurring is much lower than originally be‐
lieved and that the consequences are not as aversive as expected. Therefore, effective exposure in‐
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volves learning that “the feared situation constitutes no real danger from without, as well as infor‐
mation that anxiety reactions are of finite intensity and duration” (Foa & Kozak, p. 28).
Other components of CBT for social phobia typically include identification of safety behaviors
and their adverse effects, attention retraining (e.g., shifting focus of attention to the external social situ‐
ation to reduce problematic self‐monitoring and obtain more accurate information about people’s re‐
sponse; Wells, White, & Carter, 1997), video feedback to modify distorted self‐imagery, behavioral ex‐
periments in which patients specify their feared outcomes for various social situations and test whether
they occur during planned exposure, and identification and modification of problematic anticipatory and
post‐event processing (Stangier, Heidenreich, Peitz, Lauterbach, & Clark, 2003).
CBT has been found to be superior to other psychotherapeutic approaches in the percentages of
people improving, degree of improvement, as well as long‐term effects in follow‐up studies (Fava et al.,
2001). Comparison of pharmacological treatment with CBT reveals that both are effective in reducing
social phobia symptoms. Though pharmacological treatment works faster, relapse rates are greater than
for CBT (Sadock & Sadock, 2007). Of cognitive behavioral interventions for social phobia, cognitive be‐
havioral group therapy (CBGT) has received the most empirical support and is the “gold standard” for
treatment of social phobia (Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Heimberg, 2002). CBGT consists of cognitive restruc‐
turing, self‐guided in vivo exposure with other group members, and cognitive restructuring homework
(Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, & Kennedy, 1990). Positive follow‐up findings for CBGT in the treatment of
social phobia have been reported at six months and up to five years after the end of treatment (Heim‐
berg, et al., 1990; Heimberg, Salzman, Holt, & Blendell, 1993). Despite the demonstrated efficacy of CBT,
knowledge regarding the underlying variables that lead to treatment change is limited (Hofmann, 2000).
1.5

Probability and Cost Biases and the Treatment of Social Phobia
Recall that Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed that one mechanism of action in CBT is its reduction

in the exaggerated probabilities and costs associated with feared outcomes. They further proposed that
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the absence of negative consequences would alter the exaggerated probability estimates and that ha‐
bituation (extinction) of anxiety during exposure to feared situations would reduce inflated cost esti‐
mates through a process of emotional reasoning: “If I am not anxious, the situation cannot be so bad.”
For example, if during a role‐play, mild criticism ceases to evoke physiological arousal, then being criti‐
cized is no longer perceived as disastrous. These biases have also been challenged through the use of
social mishap exercises, in which patients evaluate their beliefs about social threats and costs by inten‐
tionally engaging in flawed social behaviors in a real world setting, and through guided discussions in
which the patient is asked, (e.g., "What would be the worst outcome of this situation?" "Why is this sit‐
uation such a catastrophic event?" "How will your life change as a result of this event?"; Hofmann &
Scepkowski, 2006).
Numerous empirical studies have hypothesized that CBT exerts its effect by modifying judgmen‐
tal biases and, indeed, studies have consistently shown that successful treatment of social anxiety is as‐
sociated with significant changes in probability and cost biases. Several studies have simply assessed
whether these biases change following treatment. Results of four studies (Franklin, Huppert, Langner,
Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Luckock & Salkovskis, 1988; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; Voncken & Bogels, 2006)
have demonstrated that CBT is associated with significant reductions in cost and probability biases. The‐
se studies did not examine whether changes in these biases actually predict or mediate treatment out‐
come.
A number of recent studies have examined the cognitive mediation hypothesis (e.g., Foa et al.,
1996; Hofmann, 2004; McManus et al., 2000). Although these studies have varied with respect to de‐
sign, measures, and analytic strategies, they converge with respect to some basic methodological fea‐
tures. Specifically, all have included measures of the proposed mediators (judgmental biases) and clini‐
cal status (i.e., social anxiety) before and after treatment (i.e., pretreatment, posttreatment, and follow‐
up assessment). Furthermore, all have assessed judgmental biases using self‐report measures that ask
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respondents to indicate the perceived probability and cost associated with hypothetical negative social
scenarios (e.g., “during a job interview, you will freeze,” “someone you know will not say hello to you”).
Foa and colleauges (1996) examined the role of cost and probability biases in treatment for social pho‐
bia and found that, after controlling for pretreatment symptom severity, depression, and changes in
probability estimates, changes in cost estimates were strongly correlated with posttreatment anxiety.
However, after controlling for initial anxiety, depression, and cost estimates, changes in probability bias
were only moderately correlated with treatment outcome. The authors interpret their findings as evi‐
dence that cost estimates—but not probability estimates—“mediate” treatment outcome, and as con‐
sistent with the notion asserted by Foa and Kozak that cost is a more influential/driving/underlying force
in social phobia.
Employing a similar statistical design (i.e., examining changes in cost and probability as predic‐
tors of posttreatment anxiety), McManus et al. (2000) found apparently contradictory results. After con‐
trolling for initial symptom severity and change in cost bias, probability remained a significant predictor
of posttreatment symptoms; however, change in cost bias was no longer a significant predictor after
controlling for change in probability and pretreatment severity.
Though the above studies are informative, true tests of whether a variable is treatment mecha‐
nism require demonstration that changes in the predictor precede changes in the dependent variable
(Kramer, Wilson, Fairburn, & Agras, 2002). Four investigations have conducted formal mediational anal‐
yses in the context of CBT for social phobia. Two of these investigations (Hofmann, 2004; Wilson &
Rapee, 2005) examined cost but not probability bias. Two others (Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald, & Telch,
2006; Nelson, Deacon, Lickel, & Sy, 2010) examined both types of judgmental biases.
In a randomized controlled trial comparing CBT and exposure therapy without explicit cognitive
interventions, Hofmann (2004) assessed social anxiety symptoms and cost estimates at three time
points (pretreatment, posttreatment, and six‐month follow‐up) and found that change in cost estimates
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was a significant mediator of change in both the CBT and exposure therapy conditions, an intriguing
finding given that the exposure‐alone treatment did not target cognitions. Only the CBT group, however,
showed continued improvement from the posttreatment to six‐month follow‐up period, which led the
author to conclude that cognitive interventions lead to better maintenance of treatment gains, and that
these gains were mediated through changes in estimated social cost. The author notes that multiple as‐
sessments of the proposed mediator during the course of treatment (versus in the follow‐up period)
would have provided data for “a finer analysis of the temporal relationship between these variables” (p.
397).
Wilson and Rapee (2005) also examined cost bias as a mediator of treatment outcome in a ran‐
domized trial investigating the effect of adding bibliotherapy to cognitive behavioral group treatment for
social phobia. Cost bias was defined as the extent to which negative social events: 1.) were suggestive of
negative personal characteristics; 2.) carried long‐term consequences; and 3.) would result in negative
evaluation. Ratings were collected at three time points: pretreatment, posttreatment, and three‐month
follow‐up. A series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that the three cost estimates
significantly predicted posttreatment symptoms; however, only the belief that negative social events
were indicative of negative personal characteristics remained a significant predictor of symptoms at fol‐
low‐up. The authors conclude that this pattern of findings suggests that the degree to which negative
social events are viewed as indicative of unfavorable self‐characteristics may be more important than
costs related to consequences in interpersonal relationships/interactions.
The conclusion that reduction of cost bias is more important than reduction of probability bias
has been challenged. Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald, and Telch (2006), in a randomized trial investigating
the efficacy of videotape feedback procedures, examined both cost and probability biases as mediators
of fear reductions within session. Participants meeting criteria for social phobia were assigned to one of
four treatment conditions (exposure + video feedback of performance; exposure + video feedback of
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audience reactions; exposure without video feedback; or credible placebo), and SUDS ratings were col‐
lected at five within‐session time points across three 75‐minute sessions within a one week period. To
test their hypothesis, a three‐step analytic approach was used : 1.) piecewise growth model to assess
change as a function of time; 2.) an individual growth modeling approach termed lower level mediation
(Kenny, Korchmaros, & Bolger, 2003) to assess whether reductions in judgmental bias accounted for re‐
ductions in fear; and 3.) a cross‐lagged panel design to assess the direction of the relations between cost
and probability biases and fear. Results indicated that 1.) reductions in judgmental biases occurred both
within and between sessions; 2.) change in probability bias accounted for a greater proportion of vari‐
ance in fear reduction than change in cost bias; and 3.) reduction of probability bias resulted in fear re‐
duction, whereas reduction in cost bias was a consequence of fear reduction. That is, only reductions in
probability estimates truly mediated treatment outcome. This finding is inconsistent with the assertion
that reductions in cost are a stronger factor than reductions in cost for fear reduction. A limitation of
this study is that the number of treatment sessions (n = 3) was too few to conduct an analysis of be‐
tween‐session change; thus the authors’ finding of mediation is limited to within‐session processes. The
authors propose as a direction for future research applying their analytic strategy to a longer treatment
protocol to provide valuable information about change between treatment sessions.
Although studies have consistently shown that successful treatment of social anxiety is associat‐
ed with significant changes in judgmental biases, the relative importance of changing probability versus
cost bias for achieving social anxiety reduction has not been examined using an experimental design un‐
til recently. Nelson, Deacon, Lickel, and Sy (2010) assigned 37 undergraduates scoring high in public
speaking fear to a single‐session intervention condition designed to reduce either the perceived proba‐
bility or perceived cost of negative outcomes associated with public speaking. The authors found that
participants in the cost condition demonstrated significantly greater improvement on measures of pub‐
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lic speaking anxiety and that this improvement was mediated by greater changes in cost estimates.
However this study used a nonclinical sample and a single‐session intervention.
In sum, probability and cost biases are influential in the treatment of social phobia. Research has
shown that changes in these biases correlate with, predict, and mediate change. However, this literature
is limited on several fronts. First, some investigations find cost to be more important, whereas others
find probability to be more important. Second, probability bias has yet to be examined as a true media‐
tor in a typical (i.e., 8 weekly sessions in a clinical sample) treatment outcome study. Third, several stud‐
ies of treatment mechanisms measured the relevant variables only before and after treatment and
therefore failed to establish that changes in judgmental biases temporally preceded changes in out‐
come. To ascertain whether changes in probability and cost biases precede changes in social anxiety (or
vice versa) requires that the variables of interest be assessed repeatedly during the course of treatment
(Kraemer et al., 2002; Kazdin & Nock, 2003; Smits, Powers, Cho, & Telch, 2004).
1.6

Purpose of the Study
The primary goals of the current research project were to examine cost and probability biases

and their relation to attention bias and treatment outcome in a randomized controlled trial of CBT for
adults diagnosed with social phobia. The aims of the present investigation were: 1.) to examine the rela‐
tion between judgmental biases and attention bias in a clinical sample at pretreatment; and 2.) to exam‐
ine whether changes in judgmental biases predict treatment outcome.
1.7
1.7.1

Expected Results
Hypothesis 1
Given the lack of previous empirical literature examining the possible relation between judg‐

mental biases and attention bias, Hypothesis 1 was exploratory in nature. Specifically, it was hypothe‐
sized that attention bias (both vigilance for and avoidance of threat) will predict cost and probability bi‐
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ases at pretreatment, such that greater bias in either direction (vigilant or avoidant) will predict higher
cost and probability estimates (i.e., a dose‐response relationship).
1.7.2

Hypothesis 2
Changes in cost and probability estimates will predict reductions in social anxiety symptoms, but

change in cost will be a stronger predictor of treatment outcome than change in probability.

2

EXPERIMENT

The present study was part of two larger treatment studies. The first study was funded by the
National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) and compared Exposure Group Therapy (EGT) and Virtual
Reality Exposure Therapy (VRE) for Social Phobia to wait‐list controls (WL) using a randomized, con‐
trolled design. The attention bias task was added to this study toward the end of participant recruit‐
ment. The second study was funded by the Anxiety Disorders Association of America (ADAA) and exam‐
ined amygdala activity as a predictor of treatment response to VRE using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), in an uncontrolled trial with a small sample. The attention bias task was included in this
study from its inception. For the purposes of this study, the procedures are the same, with the exception
that participants in the fMRI study were not randomly assigned to treatment; they all received VRE.
2.1

Participants
Participants were 100 individuals who met DSM‐IV (APA, 2000) criteria for a primary diagnosis of

generalized (n = 49) or non‐generalized social phobia (n = 51), identified public speaking as their most
feared social situation, and who either: a) completed treatment; or b) were eligible for treatment and
completed the dot probe task. Eligible participants on psychoactive medication were required to be sta‐
bilized on their current medication(s) and dosage(s) for at least 3 months and to remain on the stabilized
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regimen throughout the course of the study. Exclusion criteria included (a) history of mania, schizophre‐
nia, or other psychoses; (b) recent prominent suicidal ideation; (c) current alcohol or drug abuse or de‐
pendence; (d) inability to wear the virtual reality helmet; (e) history of seizures; and (f) inability to un‐
dergo an fMRI (e.g., claustrophobia, metallic implants; Study 2 only). Additionally, participants were re‐
quired to be literate in English.
Most participants (n = 78; 78%) received a diagnosis of Social Phobia alone. The most common
secondary diagnoses were Specific Phobia (n = 7), Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia (n = 3), General‐
ized Anxiety Disorder, (n = 3), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (n = 3), and Major Depression (n = 3).
More detailed comorbidity information can be found in Table 2.1. The sample consisted of 61% females
(n = 61) and 39% males (n = 39). Participants’ ages range from 19 to 69 with a mean age of 39.17 (SD =
11.3). The ethnic distribution of the sample was representative of the setting in which recruitment took
place (urban Atlanta). Most participants self‐identified as “Caucasian” (n = 47; 47%) or “African Ameri‐
can” (n = 34; 34%). Four participants (4%) self‐identified as “Hispanic,” 3 (3%), as “Asian American,” and
10 (10%) as “Other” (“African American/Indian/Caucasian” = 1; “Chinese” = 1; “African” = 1; “Biracial” =
1; “Eritrean American” = 1; “Arabic” = 1; “African American/Caucasian” = 1; Declined to Answer = 3). Six‐
ty‐two percent reported that they had completed college, 49% were married or living with someone as
though married, and 44% had an annual income of $50,000 or greater.
2.2

Measures
The following measures were used to assess demographics, diagnostic status, social anxiety,

judgmental biases, and attention bias.
Demographic Questionnaire (Appendix A). A series of questions were developed to assess
demographic information.
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Table 2.1 Frequency of Comorbidity in the Sample
Primary
Secondary
Third
Diagnosis
Diagnosis
Diagnosis Diagnosis
Social Phobia: Generalized

49

Social Phobia: Public Speaking

51

Fourth
Diagnosis

Fifth
Diagnosis

Specific Phobia

7

3

1

0

Major Depression

3

1

0

0

Generalized Anxiety

3

3

0

1

Dysthymia

2

0

0

0

Panic D/O w/o Agoraphobia

3

0

0

0

Obsessive Compulsive D/O

3

0

0

0

PTSD

0

0

1

0

Hypomania

0

0

1

0

Alcohol Abuse

1

0

0

0

Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM‐IV (SCID; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 2002).
The SCID is a structured diagnostic clinical interview used to assess psychological disorders based upon
the criteria of the DSM‐IV. The instrument is designed to be administered by a trained mental health
professional. Several studies (Basco et al., 2000, Fennig, Craig, Lavelle, Kovasznay, & Bromet, 1994;
Kranzler, Kadden, Babor, & Tennen, 1996) have demonstrated superior diagnostic validity of the SCID
over standard clinical interviews at intake. The administration time of the SCID can range from about 15
minutes for a subject with virtually no psychopathology or psychiatric history to up to several hours for a
subject with extensive psychiatric comorbidity. The administration time of the full SCID for a psychiatric
patient averages around 90 minutes. For the current project, the SCID was used to determine eligibility

22
status and the diagnostic status of a variety of Axis I conditions falling within the mood, alco‐
hol/substance use, and anxiety disorders modules.
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation (BFNE; Watson & Friend, 1969; Appendix B). The BFNE is a
12‐item self‐report questionnaire that assesses cognitions about negative evaluation for a variety of sit‐
uations. Responses are measured on a 5‐point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely) with overall
scores ranging from 5 to 60. The BFNE has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α =
.94 ‐ .98) and 1 month test‐retest reliability (r = .78 ‐ .94). Work with a normative sample of individuals
diagnosed with social phobia (n = 165) has reported a mean of 46.91 (SD = 9.27) (Weeks, et al., 2005).
The internal consistencies for the current study were as follows: good for pretreatment (α = 0.88), excel‐
lent for midtreatment (α = 0.90), and good for posttreatment (α = 0.89).
Outcome Probability Questionnaire (OPQ; Uren et al., 2004; Appendix C). The OPQ is a 12‐item
self‐report questionnaire that assesses an individual’s estimate of the probability that negative socially
threatening events will occur. Items are scored on a 9‐point Likert scale (0 = not at all, 8 = extremely)
with summary scores ranging from 0 to 96. Internal consistency for the measure has been be found to
range from good to excellent (Cronbach’s α = .89 ‐ .90; Uren et al., 2004). The internal consistencies for
the current study were as follows: good for pretreatment (α = 0.86), excellent for midtreatment (α =
0.91), and excellent for posttreatment (α = 0.91).
Outcome Cost Questionnaire (OCQ; Uren, et al., 2004; Appendix D). The OCQ is a 12‐item self‐
report questionnaire that assesses an individual’s estimate of the cost of negative social events. Items
are scored on a 9‐point Likert scale (0 = not at all, 8 = extremely) with summary scores ranging from 0 to
96. Internal consistency for the measure has been be found to be consistently in the excellent range
(Cronbach’s α = .92 ‐ .94; Uren et al., 2004). The internal consistencies for the current study were as fol‐
lows: good for pretreatment (α = 0.85), excellent for midtreatment (α = 0.90), and excellent for post‐
treatment (α = 0.91).
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Dot Probe Task. A modified version of the dot probe task was used to assess attentional bias
toward threatening faces relative to neutral and positive faces. The stimuli and task were the same as
those used by Mogg and Bradley (1999) and consisted of 128 stimulus faces from 64 different models,
each posing two facial expressions: one neutral and the other either threatening or happy. Thus, there
were 32 threatening faces and 32 happy faces, each matched with a neutral face of the same person.
There were 128 critical trials in which each of the 64 face pairs was presented twice, once with the emo‐
tional face on the left, and once on the right. Thus, there were 64 threat‐neutral face pairs and 64 hap‐
py‐neutral pairs. In addition to the 128 critical trials, there were 32 filler trials of neutral‐neutral face
pairs. In total, the dot probe task comprised 160 experimental trials presented in a new random order to
each participant. A brief practice trial of five face pairs preceded the task.
Participants were seated approximately 120 cm in front of a computer screen and instructed to
“hover” the first two fingers of their dominant hand over the “1” and “2” buttons of the keyboard. Par‐
ticipants were then informed they would see faces presented on the screen in pairs, one on the left side
of the screen and one on the right side of the screen. They were advised that when the faces disap‐
peared, a small dot would appear in the spatial location of one of the faces, and that when this oc‐
curred, they were to press the “1” or “2” button on the keyboard to identify the location of the dot (left
or right) as quickly as possible. On each trial a focus stimulus (a “+”) appeared in the center of the screen
for 500 ms followed by a face pair for 500 ms. The probe was presented immediately after the offset of
the face pair and remained on the screen for 1100 ms. It appeared on the left and right sides of the
screen an equal number of times. The inter‐trial interval varied randomly between 500 and 1250 ms.
The images were digitally sized to approximately 45 x 70 mm.
Emotion bias scores are calculated by subtracting response time to emotion‐incongruent stimuli
(probes that replace neutral pictures) from response time to emotion‐congruent stimuli (probes that
replace happy or threatening pictures). These bias scores can be further decomposed into threat and
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happy bias scores. For threat bias, a positive value indicates a shift of attention toward the threatening
face relative to the neutral face (vigilance), and a negative value indicates a shift away from the threat‐
ening face toward the neutral face (avoidance). Previous research conducted with this task suggests that
it validly discriminates between adults diagnosed with Social Phobia and normal controls (Mogg, Philip‐
pot, & Bradley, 2004), as well as between controls and adults diagnosed with GAD (Bradley, Mogg,
White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999).
2.3

Procedure
This study was approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board, and written

informed consent for study procedures was obtained. Participants were self‐referred or recruited
through area professionals, newspaper advertising, posted flyers, and publicity efforts. Eligibility for the
study was determined through a two‐part process consisting of a brief telephone screening and a sub‐
sequent in‐person, pretreatment assessment. After expressing interest and consenting to complete a
telephone screening, study candidates completed a short phone interview to determine if they met ob‐
vious exclusion criteria (e.g., current substance abuse, metallic implants in Study 2 only). Initial tele‐
phone screenings were conducted by doctoral students in the clinical psychology program at GSU and
consisted of a series of questions related to mood, anxiety, and substance use. Those who were not ex‐
cluded during the telephone screening were given the opportunity to participate in an in‐person, pre‐
treatment assessment at Georgia State University. Consent was obtained prior to the in‐person pre‐
treatment assessment as well.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 were prepared in accordance with guidelines outlined in the CONSORT (Con‐
solidated Standards of Reporting Trials; Altman, et al., 2001) and TREND (Transparent Reporting of Eval‐
uations with Nonrandomized Designs; Des Jarlais, Lyles, & Crepaz, 2004) statements. The figures show
the flow of participants through the two treatment studies. In Study 1, the pretreatment assessment
included a structured diagnostic clinical interview (SCID) administered by a doctoral student, a battery of
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self‐report measures, and the dot probe task. Eligible participants were then randomly assigned to VRE,
EGT, or WL (See Figure 2.1). In Study 2, the pretreatment assessment was identical to that of Study 1
except it included an additional “mock” fMRI to ensure participants could tolerate an actual fMRI. Fol‐
lowing the pretreatment assessment, eligible participants then underwent an fMRI at a nearby hospital.
These participants were not randomly assigned to treatment groups, and all received VRE Therapy (See
Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.1 CONSORT participant flow chart for Study 1
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Assigned to VRE (n =14)
 Dropped VRE (4)
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o After beginning Tx (2)

Total VRE Completers
(n =10)

Figure 2.2 TREND participant flow chart for Study 2

All pretreatment diagnostic assessments were videotaped, and a randomly selected subset was re‐
viewed by a licensed psychologist to calculate the inter‐rater reliability of pretreatment assessments
(100% agreement for primary diagnosis).
2.4

Treatment
Prior to administering therapy, study therapists attended a two‐day training workshop led by

the developers of the respective treatments. Each of the study therapists also received weekly supervi‐
sion by the primary investigator of the study. In Study 1, ratings of treatment integrity and competence
were completed by the developers of the respective treatments for a randomly selected subset of the
sessions (14%). Compliance was quite good for each treatment, with 92% and 93% of the essential ele‐
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ments of the protocol being completed for VRE and EGT, respectively, and one infraction for each
treatment arm across all sessions reviewed. Competence in delivering each element was also rated for
these sessions, using a 7‐point scale (1‐ very poor to 7‐excellent). The competence ratings also were
quite good, with a mean quality rating of 6.1 for VRE and 5.4 for EGT. The same therapists were used in
Study 1 and Study 2.
The VRE and EGT treatment groups were designed to be as similar as possible, with the
exception of the modality for the delivery of exposure. Both treatments specifically targeted public
speaking fears via exposure therapy. Furthermore, both treatments sought to address specific aspects of
Social Phobia identified in psychopathology literature, including self‐focused attention, perceptions of
self and others, perceptions of emotional control, rumination, and realistic goal setting for social situa‐
tions. The mechanism and setting through which exposure was delivered varied for each of the two
treatment groups. Individual study therapists relied on the virtual environment to facilitate exposure to
public speaking fears (VRE), while group therapists relied on other group members to help facilitate ex‐
posure (EGT). The majority of participants (n = 42) completed VRE, and the remaining (n = 34) completed
EGT.
Virtual Reality Exposure (VRE). VRE was implemented according to a manualized treatment pro‐
tocol (Anderson, Zimand, Hodges, & Rothbaum, 2005) and was administered individually by either a li‐
censed psychologist (N = 2) or an advanced doctoral student in the clinical psychology program (N = 3).
VRE treatment consisted of eight therapy sessions conducted over a period of approximately eight
weeks. During session one, participants were introduced to the VRE treatment rationale, which provides
psychoeducation about the nature of cost and probability biases, and taught how to identify and rate
their anxiety on a subjective units of discomfort scale (SUDS). Breathing training was also introduced.
Session two began with a review of the treatment rationale and then focused on teaching the concept
of cognitive restructuring, including its purpose and practice. Probability and cost biases were specifical‐

28
ly targeted and challenged via guided discussions in which evidence for and against these cognitions was
evaluated. Session three focused on self‐perceptions during public speaking. During this session, partici‐
pants reviewed video of their pretreatment speeches and were asked to compare how anxious they
looked on the video to how anxious they rated themselves while giving the speech. Session four focused
on identifying the role that both safety behaviors and self‐focused attention can play in the maintenance
of Social Phobia. Participants were first videotaped demonstrating their most commonly used safety
behaviors while giving a prepared talk. Next, participants were instructed to focus their attention on the
audience and to refrain from using safety behaviors while being videotaped giving the same talk. Then,
participants were able to observe the two videos to see how their performance and anxiety differed
when they focused on the audience while giving their talk versus when they engaged in safety behaviors
and self‐focused attention while speaking. Exposure exercises were conducted during sessions five
through eight using the virtual audience. During VRE exposure exercises participants were fitted with a
head mounted display containing screens for each eye, stereo headphones and a head tracking device,
through which they were exposed to one of three virtual environments. VR exposure environments in‐
cluded a virtual conference room (~5 audience members), a virtual classroom (~35 audience members),
and a virtual auditorium (appearance of 100+ audience members). VRE therapists had the ability to ma‐
nipulate the reactions of the audience in a number of ways including making them appear interest‐
ed/bored, supportive/hostile, distracted (e.g., cell phone ringing), as well as the ability to manipulate the
difficulty of questions that were posed by the audience. Virtual environments were manipulated accord‐
ing to the client’s goals for treatment and their pre‐constructed fear hierarchy. Participants were ex‐
posed to each item on their hierarchy until their reported fear was reduced by 50 percent before being
exposed to their next item on the hierarchy. Treatment concluded with a review of the different anxiety
management and relapse prevention strategies.
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Exposure Group Therapy (EGT). EGT (Hofmann, 2002) consisted of eight group sessions of
manualized treatment over a period of eight weeks which were co‐led by a licensed clinical psychologist
and an advanced doctoral student. Groups consisted of up to five participants. During session one,
participants were introduced to the EGT treatment rationale, which also included a discussion of cost
and probability biases, as well as the theoretical basis for exposure therapy. Session two began with a
review of the treatment model; participants were then asked to engage in their first exposure exercise
which consisted of giving a brief speech about the Social Phobia treatment models in front of the group.
Furthermore, self‐perceptions were addressed in session two, and video from each client’s treatment
model speech was used as a mechanism to help participants highlight discrepancies between how
anxious they appeared on video and how anxious they rated themselves prior to viewing the video.
Group members were also asked to provide each other with positive feedback when the videotaped
speeches were reviewed. Sessions three through six followed a similar model to that of session two.
Session seven includes real‐world exposure exercises. During this session, participants exited the lab to
engage in social mishap exercises on the GSU Campus. The social mishap exercise provided participants
with the opportunity to evaluate their beliefs about social threats and costs by intentionally engaging in
flawed social behaviors in a real world setting, while still in the presence of continued support from
other group members/therapists. The final session provided participants with tools to prevent relapse
and included a review of what was learned over the course of therapy.
Wait List (WL). The WL period (Study 1 only) lasted eight weeks after which participants
completed a battery of post WL questionnaires similar to the battery that is administered after both the
EGT and VRE treatments. Then, WL participants were randomly assigned to either VRE or EGT and
received the same 8 week treatment protocol described above.
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2.5

Data Preparation
Predictive Analytics SoftWare (PASW) Statistics, version 18.0 was used for data entry, storage,

and analyses. Accuracy and quality of data entry were monitored through the process of double entry.
Threat bias scores. Data were inspected for errors, excessive missing cases, and outliers in ac‐
cordance with the procedures used in Mogg, Bradley, and Philippot (2004). Two participants (97 and
103) were determined to have both excessive errors (14% and 8% respectively) and excessive missing
cases (27% and 12% respectively) and were therefore excluded from analyses. Reaction times (RTs) less
than 200 ms and greater than two standard deviations above the mean were defined as outliers. It was
determined that one participant had an excessive number of outliers (13%); however this participant
had already been excluded due to excessive errors and missing cases (participant 97). Threat bias scores
were calculated by subtracting average reaction time to probes replacing threatening faces from aver‐
age reaction time when probes replace neutral faces. Positive bias scores indicate faster responses to
probes following threatening stimuli (vigilance), whereas negative scores indicate slower responding to
probes following threatening stimuli (avoidance). This method of calculating threat bias scores produces
results identical to those obtained using the difference formula described by MacLeod and Mathews
(1988):
Threat Bias Score = 0.5*[(TrPl – TlPl) + (TlPr – TrPr)]
where T = threat face, P = probe, l = left position, and r = right position.
Mean threat bias scores for each subject were computed at pretreatment by averaging bias
scores from all trials.
Assumptions. Prior to conducting analyses, data were first inspected for errors, excessive miss‐
ing cases, outliers, normality, and multicollinearity using the approach described in Tabachnik & Fidell
(2007).
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To detect outliers and assess for normal variable distributions, boxplots, Q‐Q plots, and histo‐
grams with an overlaid normal curve were graphed. Outliers were defined using the criterion of greater
than or equal to three standard deviations above or below the mean of the distribution. One variable
(the OCQ at pretreatment) had three data points that were greater than three standard deviations be‐
low the mean; these data points were discarded. To test for normality, data were visually inspected,
and their skewness and kurtosis statistics were divided by their standard errors to produce z scores. This
method produced no z scores greater than 1.96; thus it was concluded that no variable’s distribution
was significantly nonnormal at the α = .05 level. To assess for multicollinearity, a correlation matrix of
all measures at each time point was computed (see Table 2.2).Though several correlations within a sin‐
gle measure at different time points were quite high (e.g., the correlation between the BFNE at pre‐
treatment and the BFNE at midtreatment was .72), no correlations between different measures were
greater than 0.7, suggesting the measures do not convey essentially the same information.
Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix of All Study Variables
1 Pre‐BFNE
2 Mid‐BFNE
3 Post‐BFNE
4 Pre‐OPQ
5 Mid‐OPQ
6 Post‐OPQ
7 Pre‐OCQ
8 Mid‐OCQ
9 Post‐OCQ

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

.72**

.59**

.47**

.47**

.41**

.43**

.41**

.28**

‐.04

1

.63**

.39**

.54**

.46**

.28*

.53**

.37**

‐.24

1

.39**

.63**

.70**

.23*

.46**

.53**

‐.30

1

.65**

.56**

.57**

.41**

.32**

.32

1

.81**

.24*

.61**

.47**

.23

1

.29**

.60**

.65**

‐.05

1

.38**

.39**

.14

1

.72**

.13

1

‐.01

10 Pre‐T.Bias
Note: BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire; OCQ = Outcome
Cost Questionnaire. * = Correlation is significant at the .05 level; ** = Correlation is significant at the .01 level

1
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2.6

Preliminary Analyses
To confirm that random group assignment produced an equal distribution of demographics and

responses to the self‐report measures at the pretreatment assessment across experimental groups
(EGT, VRE, and WL) in Study 1, correlational analyses and a series of one‐way Analyses of Variance
(ANOVA) were conducted. There were no significant differences between the treatment conditions with
regard to demographics or self‐report measures, suggesting sufficient randomization. Thus participants
in the EGT and VRE groups were combined to form a total of two experimental groups (Treated [EGT +
VRE], Not Treated [WL]). Previous outcome research on Study 1 (Anderson et al., in press) has shown
that, relative to WL, both EGT and VRE were associated with significant symptom improvements on all
but one measure (length of speech during a behavioral avoidance task for EGT and self‐reported fear of
negative evaluation for VRE), and at posttreatment, there were no differences between the EGT and
VRE groups on any process or outcome measure.
Independent samples t‐tests and correlational analyses were then conducted to determine
whether participants from the controlled trial (Study 1) and the uncontrolled trial (Study 2) were signifi‐
cantly different in terms of demographics and responses to the self‐report measures at the pretreat‐
ment assessment. There were no significant differences between Study 1 and Study 2 on any of the met‐
rics listed above; however, there was a significant difference between Study 1 and Study 2 with regard
to threat bias scores (t(38) = ‐4.676, p < .001). Participants from Study 1 evidenced a slight avoidant bias
(mThreat Bias = ‐3.33), whereas participants from Study 2 evidenced a vigilant bias (mThreat Bias = 21.77). Given
that study membership at pretreatment does not directly bear on testing and interpreting the hypothe‐
sis involving attention bias, as planned, participants from Study 2 were added to the Treated group from
Study 1 to increase sample size.
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3
3.1

RESULTS

Hypothesis 1
Attentional biases (vigilance for and avoidance of threat) will predict cost and probability biases

at pretreatment, such that greater bias in either direction (vigilant or avoidant) will predict higher cost
and probability estimates.
Because this aim involved only data from pretreatment, all participants from Study 1 and Study
2 who were eligible for treatment and completed the dot probe task were included in the analyses. Two
participants were excluded from analyses due to an excessive number of missed trials, errors, and/or
outliers, resulting in a total sample size of NTotal = 40 (nStudy 1 = 25; nStudy 2 = 15). Consistent with previous
investigations of attention bias in adults diagnosed with social phobia, the overall sample demonstrated
a slight vigilance for threat (M = 6.08; SD = 20.38). The scores ranged from ‐29.07 to 55.21, with 37.5% of
participants (n = 15) demonstrating avoidance of threat cues (defined as threat bias scores less than ze‐
ro), and 62.5% of participants (n = 25) demonstrating vigilance for threat cues (defined as threat bias
scores greater than zero). To test whether vigilance for and avoidance of threat predicted cost and
probability biases, two separate curvilinear regression analyses were conducted (one with OPQ as the
outcome variable, and one with OCQ as the outcome variable). Curvilinear regression analyses can be
used to determine if a quadratic relationship exists between two variables. A ‘quadratic’ relationship
refers to a non‐linear relationship between X and Y. In this case, it was hypothesized that as threat bias
scores approached zero or neutral, cost and probability estimates would be lower, whereas increased
threat bias scores in either direction (vigilance or avoidance) would predict higher cost and probability
estimates, forming a U‐shaped curve. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to test the
hypothesis that a quadratic relationship exists between threat bias and judgmental biases. The first re‐
gression analysis regressed scores on the OPQ at pretreatment onto threat bias scores at pretreatment
in Step 1, followed by the squared threat bias scores (Threat Bias2) in Step 2 of the model. Neither Step
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1, (F[1,38] = 0.948, Mean Square = 464.34, p = ns) nor Step 2, (F[1, 37] = 1.85, Mean Square = 444.35, p =
ns) was significant, suggesting there was neither a linear nor quadratic relationship between outcome
probability estimates and threat bias (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Curvilinear Regression Analysis for Threat Bias Predicting Outcome Probability
t
p
Variable
B
SE B
R2 Change

Step 1
Threat Bias

.165

.169

.024

.974

ns

Step 2
Threat Bias2

.011

.006

.067

1.646

ns

Figure 3.1 presents the scatterplot of threat bias and OPQ scores.

Figure 3.1 Scatterplot of outcome probability estimates and threat bias scores at pretreatment
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The data are not U‐shaped, confirming that greater bias in either direction (vigilant or avoidant) does
not predict higher probability estimates. However, given visual inspection of the scatterplot and the
paucity of literature examining the relations between attentional and judgmental biases, an additional
regression analysis was conducted using the vigilance scores (i.e, all positive, untransformed threat bias
scores) as the predictor variable and the OPQ as the outcome variable. It was found that degree of vigi‐
lance for threat was predictive of outcome probability estimates (B = .581, SEB = .232, t = 2.505, R = .463,
p < .05), such that higher vigilance scores among the individuals who had a tendency toward vigilance
predicted greater OPQ scores (see Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 Scatterplot of outcome probability estimates and vigilance for threat scores at pre‐
treatment

Ancillary analyses revealed that degree of avoidance of threat was not predictive of outcome probability
estimates (B = ‐.346, SEB = .699, t = .495, R = .136, p = ns).
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The curvilinear regression analyses were then repeated with the OCQ as the outcome variable.
Scores on the OCQ at pretreatment were regressed onto threat bias scores at pretreatment in Step 1,
followed by the squared threat bias scores (Threat Bias2) in Step 2 of the model. Results for the OCQ
were similar to the results for the OPQ. Neither Step 1, (F[1,38] = 0.321, Mean Square = 322.05, p = ns)
nor Step 2, (F[1, 37] = .185, Mean Square = 330.24, p = ns) was significant, suggesting there was neither
a linear nor quadratic relationship between outcome cost estimates and threat bias (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Curvilinear Regression Analysis for Threat Bias Predicting Outcome Cost Estimates
Curvilinear Regression Analysis for Threat Bias Predicting Outcome Cost Estimates
t
p
Variable
B
SE B
R2 Change

Step 1
Threat Bias

.080

.141

.008

.567

ns

Step 2
Threat Bias2

.001

.006

.002

.241

ns

Figure 3.3 presents the scatterplot of threat bias and OCQ scores.

Figure 3.3 Scatterplot of outcome cost estimates and threat bias scores at pretreatment
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The data are not U‐shaped, confirming that greater bias in either direction (vigilant or avoidant) does
not predict higher cost estimates. Ancillary analyses revealed that outcome cost estimates were not sig‐
nificantly predicted by either degree of vigilance for threat (B = .184, SEB = .234, t = .786, R = .162, p = ns)
or by degree of avoidance of threat (B = .024, SEB = .522, t = .045, R = .013, p = ns).
3.2

Hypothesis 2
Changes in cost and probability estimates will account for reductions in social anxiety symptoms,

but changes in cost will be a stronger predictor of treatment outcome than changes in probability.
Evaluating this hypothesis involved a series of analytical steps. First, the effect of treat‐
ment on cost and probability estimates (OPQ, OCQ) and on social anxiety symptoms (BFNE) was tested.
Second, the contributions of changes in cost and probability estimates to treatment outcome were eval‐
uated. Third, the relative influence of changes in cost versus probability estimates on social anxiety
symptoms were compared to determine if one was a stronger predictor of treatment outcome.
Step 1. Did treatment have an effect on cost and probability estimates and social anxiety
symptoms? To determine if treatment was associated with significant reductions in social anxiety symp‐
toms and outcome cost and probability estimates, participants who were initially assigned to and who
completed treatment in Study 1 (n = 51) or who completed treatment in Study 2 (n = 10; NTreated = 61)
were compared to the WL participants from Study 1 (NNot Treated = 25) to test whether participants’ scores
on the OPQ, OCQ, and BFNE were significantly reduced following treatment. A series of 2 x 2 mixed de‐
sign ANOVAs was conducted with Time (pretreatment, posttreatment) as the within‐subjects/repeated
measures variable and Group (Treated , Not Treated) as the between‐subjects variable. For all variables,
a main effect for Time was found, as well as a statistically significant Group x Time interaction (see Table
3.3).
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Table 3.3 2 x 2 (Time x Group) ANOVAs Comparing the Outcome and Predictor Variables at
Pretreatment and Posttreatment (Step 1)
df
F
p
BFNE (n = 82)
Time

1

11.70

< .001

Group

1

3.75

.06

Time x Group Interaction

1

10.14

< .01

Time

1

56.35

< .001

Group

1

3.66

.06

Time x Group Interaction

1

6.30

< .05

Time

1

33.14

< .001

Group

1

2.87

.09

Time x Group Interaction

1

9.26

< .01

OPQ (n = 84)

OCQ (n = 82)

Note: BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire; OCQ = Outcome Cost Ques‐
tionnaire

Follow‐up paired samples t‐tests revealed that participants in the Treated group had significant‐
ly lower scores on the OPQ, OCQ, and BFNE at posttreatment compared to pretreatment. Participants in
the Not Treated group did not have significantly lower scores on the BFNE post‐wait; however, their
scores on the OPQ and OCQ were significantly lower post‐wait (See Table 3.4). However, treatment had
a significantly greater effect on the OPQ and OCQ than no treatment, as evidenced by the significant
interaction.
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Outcome and Predictor Variables at Pretreatment and
Posttreatment for Treated and Not Treated Participants (Step 1)
Not Treated
Treated
Pre‐wait

Post‐wait

Pretreatment

Posttreatment

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

BFNE

42.55 (9.77)

42.36 (10.16)

42.34 (8.98)

36.00 (7.97)

OPQ

52.42 (18.62)

41.88 (20.07)

51.81 (19.42)

28.74 (17.81)

OCQ

62.26 (17.49)

55.52 (18.07)

64.78 (15.69)

42.22 (21.81)

Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; OPQ = Outcome
Probability Questionnaire; OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire

Step 2. Do reductions in judgmental biases predict reductions in social anxiety symptoms? To
examine whether changes in judgmental biases predict reductions in social anxiety symptoms, addition‐
al analyses were conducted within the Treated group (N = 76) that employed the midtreatment data
(see Table 3.5 for descriptive statistics).
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for the Outcome and Predictor Variables at Pretreatment, Mid‐
treatment, and Posttreatment (Step 2)
Pretreatment
Midtreatment
Posttreatment
M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

BFNE

42.36 (9.07)

40.46 (9.06)

36.00 (7.97)

OPQ

51.73 (19.30)

37.93 (19.37)

28.74 (17.81)

OCQ

66.49 (12.72)

52.43 (19.76)

41.80 (21.97)

Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; OPQ = Out‐
come Probability Questionnaire; OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire

The midtreatment data were a necessary inclusion because a simple pre‐post comparison would
not allow for tests of whether changes in cognitive mechanisms temporally preceded changes in social
anxiety symptoms. Structural equation modeling (SEM), specifically path analysis, was used to assess the
fit between: (1) models hypothesizing specific presumed ‘causal’ relations among variables; and (2) the
observed set of correlations between the variables in the models. SEM refers to a family of flexible sta‐
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tistical procedures based on covariances and means and applicable to both experimental and nonexper‐
imental data (Kline, 2005). With SEM methodology, models are specified a priori, and models are tested
for acceptable fit of the data to the hypothesized models and comparative fit across several hypothe‐
sized models using several fit indices. SEM framework allows error correction, missing data, and com‐
plex sample designs, and therefore provides a more powerful analysis than straightforward significance
tests. Two main components of models are distinguished in SEM: the structural model, showing poten‐
tial causal dependencies between endogenous and exogenous variables, and the measurement model,
showing the relations between latent variables and their indicators. Path analysis can be viewed as a
special case of SEM that involves a structural model, but no measurement model. It involves the estima‐
tion of presumed causal relations among observed variables and allows the simultaneous modeling of
several related regression relationships (Muthèn & Muthèn, 1998‐2010). When assessing direct effects
of one variable on another over time, cross‐lagged panel designs are among the most effective tech‐
niques (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981; Menard, 1991) and are useful in examining reciprocal relations
among variables.
To test hypotheses, SEM software Mplus 6 (Muthèn & Muthèn, 1998‐2010) with maximum‐
likelihood estimation to test the fit of a hypothesized model to the observed variance‐covariance matrix,
was used. Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors allows for the use of all available
data regardless of missing data at particular time points. According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988), the
use of maximum likelihood estimation results in unbiased parameter estimates that are of practical im‐
portance when N = 50 or greater (as cited in Zacher, 2011).
Prior to conducting any SEM analyses, a model must first be specified. In the present study, a
cross‐lagged panel design path model was used to analyze the relation between social anxiety symp‐
toms (BFNE) and cost and probability biases (OCQ, OPQ) at three time points: pretreatment, midtreat‐
ment, and posttreatment. The OPQ and OCQ were examined separately as predictors, and the BFNE
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was the outcome measure. Figure 3.4 shows the hypothesized model with the OPQ as the predictor; an
identical model was hypothesized with the OCQ as the predictor.

BFNE
Pre‐tx

BFNE
Mid‐tx

BFNE
Post‐tx

OPQ
Pre‐tx

OPQ
Mid‐tx

OPQ
Post‐tx

Figure 3.4 Hypothesized cross‐lagged panel design path model

The cross‐lagged panel design model includes the influence of judgmental biases at pretreatment and
midtreatment on social anxiety symptoms at midtreatment and posttreatment respectively, and the
influence of social anxiety symptoms at pretreatment and midtreatment on judgmental biases at mid‐
treatment and posttreatment, respectively. These aspects of the model are referred to as the cross lags.
The model also includes the influence of judgmental biases at pretreatment on judgmental biases at
midtreatment, and the influence of judgmental biases at midtreatment on judgmental biases at post‐
treatment. The same is true for social anxiety symptoms. These aspects of the model, called autoregres‐
sive effects, can be thought of as indicators of the temporal stability of the measures. Estimations of
these parameters in the model control for the stability of the variables across time. Thus any cross‐
lagged effects can be considered effects that add predictive power over and above that which can simp‐
ly be obtained from within‐construct stability over time. Finally, social anxiety symptoms and judgmen‐

42
tal biases were each allowed to intercorrelate within each time point, represented by curved, double‐
headed arrows. These aspects of the model are called synchronous correlations and account for covari‐
ances between judgmental biases and social anxiety symptoms that are not already explained by the
influences of the variables from earlier time points. This design allowed for a test of the effect of the
predictor variable at midtreatment on the outcome variable at posttreatment, while controlling for the
predictor and outcome variable at all other time points. Thus this design allowed us to investigate the
causal interplay between judgmental biases and social anxiety across treatment, allowing evaluation of
whether early changes in judgmental biases (operationalized as scores at midtreatment, controlling for
scores at pretreatment) drove later changes in social anxiety (operationalized as scores at posttreat‐
ment, controlling for scores at pre‐ and midtreatment), or whether early changes in social anxiety drove
later changes in judgmental biases, or whether the relationship was reciprocal.
Zero‐order correlations were first computed to determine whether the variables under investi‐
gation (BFNE, OPQ, OCQ) were related to each other. All expected auto‐ and intercorrelations were sig‐
nificant, with one exception: the OCQ at pretreatment was not significantly correlated with the OCQ at
midtreatment (See Table 3.6).
Table 3.6 Correlation Matrix of All Hypothesis 2 Study Variables at Each Time Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 Pre‐BFNE
2 Mid‐BFNE
3 Post‐BFNE
4 Pre‐OPQ
5 Mid‐OPQ
6 Post‐OPQ
7 Pre‐OCQ
8 Mid‐OCQ
9 Post‐OCQ

1

.72**

.52**

.47**

.47**

.34**

.36**

.41**

.24*

1

.63**

.39**

.54**

.46**

.31**

.53**

.37**

1

.42**

.63**

.67**

.18

.46**

.52**

1

.65**

.54**

.49**

.41**

.33**

1

.81**

.11

.61**

.47**

1

.10

.60**

.65**

1

.22

.24*

1

.72**
1

Note: BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire; OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire
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The cross‐lagged panel design path model was then evaluated for overall model fit. In line with
the recommendations of Hoyle and Panter (1995), various measures of fit were used to evaluate the
model. Absolute fit indices indicate the degree to which a pattern of fixed and free parameters specified
in the model is consistent with the pattern of variances and covariances from the observed data. In the
present study, the following absolute fit indices were be used to evaluate the overall fit of each of the
models: the Model Chi‐Square (χ2), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger,
1990), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
(SRMR). Information regarding these fit indices is detailed below.
The Model Chi‐Square value is the traditional measure for evaluating overall model fit. It “as‐
sesses the magnitude of discrepancy between the sample and fitted covariance matrices” (Hu and Bent‐
ler, 1999, p. 2). A good model fit would provide a nonsignificant result at the p < 0.05 threshold (Barrett,
2007), thus the Chi‐Square statistic is often referred to as a measure of ‘badness of fit’ (Kline, 2005).
The RMSEA indicates how well the model, with unknown but optimally chosen parameter esti‐
mates, would fit the population’s covariance matrix (Byrne, 1998). The RMSEA is regarded as “one of the
most informative fit indices” due to its sensitivity to the number of estimated parameters in the model
(Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000, p. 85). The RMSEA favors parsimony in that it will choose the model
with the lesser number of parameters. Values of .01, .05, and .08 indicate excellent, good, and mediocre
fit, respectively (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Confidence intervals for the RMSEA are also
generally reported. In a well‐fitting model, the lower limit is close to 0 while the upper limit should be
less than 0.08.
The CFI assesses the model by comparing the χ2 value of the model to the χ2 of the null model.
The null model is the worst case scenario, as it specifies that all measured variables are uncorrelated.
The CFI takes into account sample size (Byrne, 1998) and performs well even when sample size is small
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Values for this statistic range between 0.0 and 1.0 with values closer to
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1.0 indicating good fit. A value of CFI ≥ 0.95 is presently recognized as indicative of good fit (Hu and
Bentler, 1999).
The SRMR is the square root of the difference between the mean absolute value of the residuals
of the sample covariance matrix and the hypothesized covariance model. Values for the SRMR range
from zero to 1.0, with well‐fitting models obtaining values less than .05 (Byrne, 1998; Diamantopoulos &
Siguaw, 2000), however values as high as 0.08 are deemed acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Cross‐lagged model fitting‐ OPQ. The cross‐lagged model was first evaluated for overall model
fit using the OPQ as the predictor. The model had good indices of fit, with the exception of the upper
limit of the RMSEA confidence interval: Model χ2(4) = 4.221, p = 0.37; RMSEA = 0.027 [0.000, 0.177]; CFI
= 0.999; SRMR = 0.016. Next, the standardized parameter estimates of each proposed path were exam‐
ined. Standardized parameter estimates are transformations of unstandardized estimates that remove
scaling and can be used for comparisons of parameters throughout the model and across models. The
standardized path estimates indicate the expected difference on the outcome variable in standard devi‐
ation units, given an increase in the predictor variable of one full standard deviation. Significant paths
were determined through examination of the ratio of each parameter estimate to its standard error,
which is distributed as a z statistic and is significant at the 0.05 level if its value exceeds 1.96 and at the
0.01 level it its value exceeds 2.56 (Hoyle, 1995). Figure 3.5 shows the path diagram results for the
model. The standardized parameter estimates are shown, with their standard errors in parentheses.
Significant parameter estimates are indicated with asterisks (*). As predicted, examination of individual
paths revealed significant autoregressive effects and intercorrelations between variables at each time
point. The full model also revealed a significant effect of pretreatment BFNE on midtreatment OPQ (Es‐
timate = 0.201, z = 2.111, p < .05) and of midtreatment OPQ on posttreatment BFNE (Estimate = 0.393, z
= 4.096, p < .001).
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BFNE
Pre‐tx

.47 (.09)***

OPQ
Pre‐tx

.68 (.07)***

BFNE
Mid‐tx

.34 (.10)**

.56 (.09)***

OPQ
Mid‐tx

.42 (.10)***

BFNE
Post‐tx

.41 (.10)***

.79 (.06)***

OPQ
Post‐tx

Figure 3.5 Cross‐lagged panel design path diagram with the OPQ as the predictor

However, the cross lag from pretreatment OPQ to midtreatment BFNE was not significant (Estimate =
0.055, z = 0.585; p = ns); nor was the cross lag from midtreatment BFNE to posttreatment OPQ (Estimate
= 0.030, z = 0.367, p = ns). Importantly, that the path from midtreatment OPQ to posttreatment BFNE is
significant suggests that probability bias at midtreatment predicts social anxiety symptoms at post‐
treatment, while controlling for probability bias and social anxiety at all other time points. That the in‐
verse is not true (i.e., that midtreatment BFNE does not predict posttreatment OPQ) provides further
evidence that probability estimates drove treatment outcome, and not vice versa.
To obtain the most parsimonious model, a final model was calculated in which the non‐
significant paths were removed from the model. Chi‐square difference tests and comparative fit indi‐
ces—specifically the Bayes information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978; Raftery, 1993), and the sample‐
size adjusted BIC (saBIC; Sclove, 1987)—were used to determine if the fit of the model was reduced by
removing these non‐significant paths. A nonsignificant χ2 difference test indicates that both models fit
equally well statistically, so the parameters in question can be eliminated from the model (Schermelleh‐
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Engel, Moosbrugger, & Muller, 2003). The BIC is an alternative to the χ2 goodness‐of‐fit test statistic that
assigns a penalty to model complexity that is a function of the sample size. Thus the BIC is less influ‐
enced by large sample sizes and thus less prone to rejecting a more restrictive model when deviations
between the baseline and restricted model are relatively small. However, the BIC penalizes for model
complexity to a great degree. The BIC has been widely used for model identification in time series and
linear regression analyses. Like the BIC, the saBIC penalizes for adding parameters based on the sample
size, but does not place as high a penalty as the BIC. The saBIC has been used successfully with smaller
samples (Lubke & Neal, 2006). The model with the lowest BIC and saBIC values has the best fit to the
observed data.
Results of the chi‐square difference tests showed that the fit of the model was not significantly
reduced by removing these non‐significant paths, and the comparative fit indices indicated that the
model with the two nonsignificant paths removed was the best‐fitting model (see Table 3.7).

Table 3.7 Chi‐Square Difference Test Results and Comparative Fit Indices for Parsimonious OPQ
Model

χ Diff2 Test Statistics
Model
Full Model
Path from Pre‐OPQ to Mid‐
BFNE removed
Path from Mid‐ BFNE to Post‐
OPQ removed
Both non‐significant paths
removed

χ2

df

Δ χ 2 (df)

p

BIC

saBIC

4.221

4

‐

‐

3383.37

3310.87

4.563

5

.342

.559

3379.38

3310.03

4.563

5

.342

.559

3379.17

3309.83

4.696

6

.475

.789

3326.24

3308.99

Note: Note: BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; OPQ = Outcome Probability Questionnaire

47
Cross‐lagged model fitting‐ OCQ. The cross‐lagged model was then re‐evaluated for overall
model fit using the OCQ as the predictor. Analyses revealed a pattern of findings identical to those
found when using the OPQ as the predictor. Again, the model had good indices of fit, with the exception
of the upper limit of the RMSEA confidence interval: Model χ2(4) = 4.971, p = 0.29; RMSEA = 0.057
[0.000, 0.190]; CFI = 0.994; SRMR = 0.022. Figure 3.6 shows the path diagram results for the model.
BFNE
Pre‐tx

.70 (.07)***

.53 (.10)***

.38 (.10)***

.38 (.10)***

OCQ
Pre‐tx

BFNE
Mid‐tx

.15 (.12)

OCQ
Mid‐tx

BFNE
Post‐tx

.35 (.10)**

.73 (.08)***

OCQ
Post‐tx

Figure 3.6 Cross‐lagged panel design path diagram with the OCQ as the predictor

As with the OPQ, examination of individual paths revealed significant intercorrelations between varia‐
bles at each time point; however, the OCQ at pretreatment was not predictive of the OCQ at midtreat‐
ment, suggesting this measure was not stable from pretreatment to midtreatment. Similar to the model
with the OPQ, the model with the OCQ revealed a significant effect of pretreatment BFNE on midtreat‐
ment OCQ (Estimate = 0.346, z = 3.158, p < .01) and a significant effect of midtreatment OCQ on post‐
treatment BFNE (Estimate = 0.201, z = 1.925, p = 05). Also like the OPQ model, the cross lag from pre‐
treatment OCQ to midtreatment BFNE was not significant (Estimate = 0.037, z = 0.383; p = ns); nor was
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the cross lag from midtreatment BFNE to posttreatment OPQ (Estimate = ‐0.018, z = ‐0.192, p = ns). Im‐
portantly, that the path from midtreatment OCQ to posttreatment BFNE was significant suggests that
cost bias at midtreatment predicts social anxiety symptoms at posttreatment, while controlling for cost
bias and social anxiety at all other time points. That the inverse is not true (i.e., that midtreatment BFNE
does not predict posttreatment OCQ) provides further evidence that cost estimates drove treatment
outcome, and not vice versa.
To obtain the most parsimonious model for the OCQ, a final model was calculated in which the
non‐significant paths were removed from the model. Results of chi‐square difference tests showed that
the fit of the model was not significantly reduced by removing these non‐significant paths, and compar‐
ative fit indices indicated the model without the three nonsignificant paths was the best‐fitting model
(see Table 3.8).
Table 3.8 Chi‐Square Difference Test Results and Comparative Fit Indices for the Parsimonious
OCQ Model

χ Diff2 Test Statistics
χ2

df

Δ χ2
(df)

p

BIC

saBIC

Full Model

4.971

4

‐

‐

3398.13

3325.63

Path from pre‐OCQ to mid‐BFNE re‐
moved

5.116

5

.145

.703

3393.94

3324.60

Path from mid‐BFNE to post‐OCQ re‐
moved

5.007

5

.036

.850

3393.93

3324.49

Path from pre‐OCQ to mid‐OCQ re‐
moved

6.381

5

1.410

.235

3395.21

3325.86

All 3 non‐significant paths removed

6.419

7

1.448

.694

3386.58

3323.54

Model

Note: Note: BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; OCQ = Outcome Cost Questionnaire
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Step 3. Which is a stronger predictor of reductions in social anxiety symptoms: reductions in
outcome cost or outcome probability estimates? To evaluate the relative influence of changes in cost
versus probability estimates on treatment outcome, the standardized parameter estimate of the cross
lag from the predictor variable at midtreatment to the outcome variable at posttreatment in the OPQ
model was compared to the corresponding standardized parameter estimate in the OCQ model. By con‐
vention, standardized path coefficients with absolute values less than 0.10 may indicate a “small” effect,
values around 0.30 indicate a “medium” effect, and values greater than 0.50, a “large” effect (Suhr,
2008). In the OPQ model, this path was statistically significant, and the effect size was medium‐large
(Estimate = .393). In the OCQ model, the path was also statistically significant (p = .05), and the effect
size was medium‐small (Estimate = .201). The OPQ estimate is approximately twice as large as—and 2
standard errors larger than—the OCQ estimate, suggesting that changes in the OPQ were a stronger
predictor of treatment outcome in its model than changes in the OCQ were in its model.

4

CONCLUSIONS

The aims of the present investigation were to: 1.) examine the relation between judgmental bi‐
ases and attentional biases in a clinical sample of adults diagnosed with social phobia; and 2.) examine
whether changes in judgmental biases predict treatment outcome of CBT for social phobia.
With regard to the first aim, the hypothesis that greater attentional bias for threat in either di‐
rection (vigilance or avoidance) would predict higher cost and probability estimates was not supported,
suggesting that there is not a simple dose‐response relationship between attentional and judgmental
biases. However, a significant relation was observed between attentional vigilance and outcome proba‐
bility estimates, such that greater vigilance for threat predicted greater estimates of the likelihood that
negative social events will occur. Given that this study was the first empirical investigation of the rela‐
tion between judgmental and attentional biases, these findings are neither in contrast with nor con‐
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sistent with previous research. They can, however, be discussed in the context of extant theories of so‐
cial phobia.
The finding that avoidance of threatening faces was not positively related to outcome cost or
probably estimates is not in line with Clark and Wells’ (1995) cognitive model of social phobia, which
states that excessive self‐focused attention (often operationalized as avoidance of external threat stimu‐
li) prevents socially anxious individuals from processing social cues and receiving accurate information
regarding social situations. However, other scholars (e.g. Pineles & Mineka, 2005) have aptly pointed out
that self‐focused attention and avoidance of external stimuli are not necessarily two sides of the same
coin/construct—i.e., just because a person is avoiding external stimuli does not automatically mean s/he
is attending to internal stimuli; thus attentional avoidance of external threat provides only indirect evi‐
dence that a person’s attention is excessively self‐focused.
The finding that there was a significant positive relation between attentional vigilance and prob‐
ability bias is, however, consistent with Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive‐behavioral model of so‐
cial phobia, which states that probability estimates are “based on preceding stages of the model” (p.
749), one of which is the preferential allocation of attentional resources to external indicators of nega‐
tive evaluation. This finding is also consistent with Heinrichs and Hofmann’s (2001) assertion that biased
attentional allocation is the pathway by which individuals with social phobia inaccurately interpret social
threat. The cross‐sectional design of the present study did not, however, allow for temporal or causal
inferences; thus, it cannot be concluded (as hypothesized by Heinrichs & Hofmann) that attentional pro‐
cess served as a precursor to judgmental processes. Given that previous research has shown that atten‐
tional biases change with treatment for social phobia (Pishyar et al., 2007; Calamaras, Tone, & Ander‐
son, 2012), future longitudinal research should examine whether the changes in attention bias associat‐
ed with treatment predict or mediate changes in judgmental biases. Such a finding would provide sup‐
port for notion that attentional processes serve as precursors to later interpretive processes.
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That vigilance for—but not avoidance of—threat was related to probability estimates is of po‐
tential relevance to the small body of literature on attention bias subtypes, which argues that individuals
who differ with regard to type of attention bias (avoidant or vigilant) may have different clinical profiles
and/or responses to treatment (Price, Tone, & Anderson, 2011; Calamaras et al., 2012; Waters, Mogg, &
Bradley, 2012). Alternatively, there may be methodological reasons why an avoidant attentional bias
was not related to judgmental biases. First, the overall sample size (N = 40) was relatively small, and only
15 participants had an avoidant bias, which may have precluded adequate detection of potential trends
in the data (i.e., a significant relation between attentional avoidance and, for example, cost estimates
might have emerged in a larger sample). Second, although the dot probe task is a widely used measure
of attention bias, scholars have raised issues with regard to its reliability (Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard,
2009) and ecological validity (Tone et al., 2013).
In the present study, there was a significant difference between Study 1 and Study 2 with regard
to threat bias scores, such that participants from Study 1 evidenced a slight avoidant bias, whereas par‐
ticipants from Study 2 evidenced a vigilant bias. This finding was contrary to expectations and is not
easily explained. The procedures of the pretreatment assessment (when the dot probe task was admin‐
istered) were identical between Study 1 and Study 2 with two exceptions: Study 2’s pretreatment as‐
sessments occurred approximately two years after Study 1’s and included a mock fMRI. Given that no
extremely salient national event (e.g., 9/11) occurred between Study 1 and Study 2 that might explain
why the overall sample would become more vigilant, perhaps participants’ knowledge of the upcoming
mock fMRI primed them to be extra‐vigilant for threat. However, by definition (i.e., study inclusion crite‐
ria), all participants in Study 2 were able to tolerate undergoing an fMRI. This unexplained finding, cou‐
pled with previous studies that have called into question the reliability and validity of the task, suggests
that future research is needed to better understand the psychometric properties of the dot probe task.
First, test‐retest reliability in both clinical and control samples should be tested. Next, convergent validi‐
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ty could be examined by correlating performance on the dot probe task with other measures of atten‐
tion bias (e.g., Stroop paradigm, Posner paradigm, eye‐movement monitoring). Once the reliability and
validity of the dot probe task have been satisfactorily established, the next step in the current line of
research would be to replicate the findings of the present study in a larger sample, one more adequately
powered to detect potential trends among avoidant participants.
With regard to the second aim, overall, the hypothesis that changes in cost and probability es‐
timates would account for reductions in social anxiety symptoms was supported. Contrary to expecta‐
tions, however, changes in probability bias were a stronger predictor of treatment outcome than chang‐
es in cost bias.
First, as predicted, it was found that CBT for social phobia had a significant effect on social anxi‐
ety symptoms as well as on outcome cost and probability estimates. Second, and also as hypothesized, it
was found that both cost and probability estimates at midtreatment predicted social anxiety symptoms
at posttreatment, while controlling for cost and probability estimates and social anxiety symptoms at all
prior time points. Social anxiety symptoms at midtreatment did not predict cost and probability biases
at posttreatment, suggesting that early changes in cost and probability biases were predictive of later
changes in social anxiety symptoms, not vice versa. Third, when the relative contributions of changes in
cost and probability biases to treatment outcome were compared, the effect size for probability esti‐
mates was medium‐large (Estimate = .393), and the effect size for cost estimates was medium‐small (Es‐
timate = .201), suggesting that changes in probability estimates were a stronger predictor of treatment
outcome than changes in cost estimates.
The findings of the present study are commensurate with previous research which has shown
that cost and probability biases are influential in the treatment of social phobia. That treatment attenu‐
ated outcome cost and probability estimates is consistent with a sizable number of previous studies
showing that these biases are responsive to CBT (Franklin et al., 2005; Luckock & Salkovskis, 1988; Poul‐
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ton & Andrews, 1996; Voncken & Bogels, 2006). Theoretically, the finding that early changes in cost and
probability biases predicted later changes in social anxiety symptoms is consistent with Foa and Kozak’s
hypothesis that that the efficacy of CBT in ameliorating pathological anxiety is mediated by reduction in
the exaggerated probabilities and costs associated with feared consequences. In contrast with Foa and
Kozak, however, the findings of this study do not support their assertion that exaggerated cost is more
likely to underlie social anxiety than elevated probability, as changes in probability estimates were a
stronger predictor of treatment outcome than were changes in cost. Thus this study provides support
for the cognitive mediation hypothesis of social phobia and points to both outcome cost and outcome
probability as potential mechanisms of treatment for social phobia.
The finding that probability bias is as important as—if not more important than—cost bias in the
treatment of social phobia is particularly interesting given that, historically, fewer studies have exam‐
ined probability bias as a mediator of treatment outcome. This disparity in the literature likely stems
from Foa and Kozak’s original (1986) argument that estimated social cost is the primary mediating varia‐
ble of cognitive treatment change. More recently, other researchers have echoed this sentiment by ar‐
guing that cost bias is a particularly suitable target for intervention in social phobia because, whereas
other anxiety disorders are characterized by overestimates of the probability of objectively catastrophic
outcomes (e.g., heart attack in panic disorder, death of a loved one in generalized anxiety disorder), the
feared outcomes in social phobia are not objectively dangerous (e.g., appearing foolish, being embar‐
rassed; Hofmann & Scepkowski, 2006; Hofmann & Otto, 2008; Nelson, Lickel, Sy, Dixon, & Deacon,
2010). Our finding that probability bias was a stronger predictor of treatment outcome is consistent,
however, with two of the four previous investigations that examined both cost and probability biases as
mediators of treatment outcome (McManus et al., 2000; Smits et al., 2006). In both the present study
and the investigation by Smits and colleagues (2006), all participants reported significant public speaking
fears, which could call into question whether public speaking anxiety in particular is characterized by a
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probability bias. However, McManus and colleagues’ (2000) sample was not restricted to participants
with substantial public speaking fears. Thus it seems unlikely that this finding is an artifact of the type of
social fear targeted by treatment. Taken together, these studies and the present study suggest that it
may be useful for researchers to increase the amount of attention dedicated to 1.) understanding prob‐
ability bias as a treatment mechanism and 2.) developing probability‐specific interventions, which here‐
tofore have received less research attention than cost‐specific interventions (e.g., Nelson et al., 2010).
There are a number of features of our methodological approach that are noteworthy. Prior to
detailing these features, however, a brief discussion of the terms ‘mediator’ and ‘mechanism’ is war‐
ranted. In psychotherapy process research, these terms are often used interchangeably to refer to pro‐
cesses or events that lead to and cause therapeutic change. It is important to distinguish between con‐
ceptual mediation (a process or mechanism hypothesized to account for therapeutic change, e.g., Foa &
Kozak’s cognitive mediation hypothesis) and a formal statistical test of mediation. Distinguishing be‐
tween statistical and conceptual mediation helps explain why some studies (e.g., Foa et al., 1996;
McManus et al., 2000) have concluded that cost or probability biases “mediate” treatment outcome
without completing formal tests of statistical mediation, and why other studies which did complete for‐
mal tests of mediation (e.g., Calamaras & Anderson, 2012) are limited in how informative they are.
A formal test of statistical mediation of the type outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) would
show that the effects of treatment versus no treatment on symptom improvement were eliminated or
reduced after controlling for changes in the mediator. According to Kraemer et al.’s (2002) recommen‐
dations for identifying mediators of treatment effects in randomized clinical trials, to show that a varia‐
ble is a mediator of treatment, the following steps must be demonstrated: 1.) treatment must be related
therapeutic change; 2.) treatment must be related to the proposed mediator; 3.) the proposed mediator
must be related to therapeutic change; and 4.) the relation between treatment and therapeutic change
must be reduced after statistically controlling for the proposed mediator. However, there are a number
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of practical limitations to this approach, which have been detailed compellingly by Kazdin and Nock
(2003) among others. The primary limitation of this approach is that the simple pre/post designs com‐
mon to treatment outcome studies imply a timeline (i.e., that the mechanism led to the outcome), when
really the data are cross‐sectional. According to Kazdin and Nock, the study of mechanisms of change in
therapy, or the reasons why therapy produces effects, requires repeated assessment during the course
of treatment of both the proposed mechanism and symptom change to establish a time line (i.e., tem‐
porality). To date, studies of treatment mechanisms have consistently failed to establish that change in
the proposed mechanism occurs before change in the outcome variable—a necessary precondition for
deeming a variable a treatment mechanism. In the present study, examining cost and probability biases
and their relation to social anxiety symptoms at pretreatment, midtreatment, and posttreatment, while
controlling for autoregressive effects, allowed for a finer‐grained analysis than simple pre/post designs.
The cross‐lagged panel allowed for effective delineation of the specific contribution of changes in judg‐
mental biases to social anxiety symptom reduction and addressed the issue of temporal precedence by
allowing for tests of whether early changes in probability and cost biases predicted later changes in so‐
cial anxiety or vice versa.
Because we used midtreatment data to establish temporality, the analyses of the present study
deviate from Kraemer’s recommendations for testing mechanisms of action in randomized controlled
trials. This deviation was due to the fact that midtreatment data were only available from participants
who completed either of the two treatments in the study (i.e., not from the WL group); thus a formal
test of statistical mediation could not be conducted. However, we were able to first establish that
treatment had an effect on social anxiety symptoms as well as on cost and probability biases (see Step 1)
prior to testing the relation between cost and probability biases and treatment outcome. Several previ‐
ously published studies have utilized a similar multi‐step approach when examining “mediation” of
treatment outcome with pretreatment, posttreatment, and follow‐up data, when follow‐up data were
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not available for their control group (e.g., Hofmann, 2004; Wilson & Rapee, 2005) or when data from a
control group were not available (e.g., Smits et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2010). Thus, though a statistical
test of mediation was not conducted in the present study, the current project nonetheless addresses
important limitations of the existing literature by providing a more methodologically rigorous test of the
cognitive mediation hypothesis through its assessment of the temporality of the relations between
judgmental biases and social anxiety.
In addition to addressing limitations of previous research regarding the temporality criterion,
the current project contributes to the social phobia treatment mechanism literature in one other major
way: it is the first to examine probability bias as a treatment mechanism in a typical (i.e., 8 weekly ses‐
sions with a clinical sample) treatment outcome study. Though related, cost and probability bias are
conceptually distinct, making it important to examine each separately. In the present study, examining
both cost and probability biases as potential mechanisms allowed us to compare the relative contribu‐
tions of each to treatment outcome and examine whether one was more influential, a topic of consider‐
able debate in the literature.
In spite of these significant methodological strengths, there are several limitations to the pre‐
sent study, some of which pertain to the measures used. First, contrary to expectations, treated partici‐
pants’ scores on the OCQ at pretreatment were not related to their scores on the OCQ at midtreatment.
This unexpected finding, coupled with the fact that the non‐treated WL participants’ scores on both the
OCQ and OPQ improved significantly over time (without treatment) raises concerns about whether par‐
ticipants’ interpretation/understanding of these questionnaires was consistent across time. Given that
the pretreatment OCQ was only included in the model to represent the amount of change from pre‐
treatment to midtreatment, its lack of relation to itself at midtreatment should not have negative impli‐
cations for the interpretation of the results. However, that the OPQ and OCQ changed over time without
treatment does have potentially negative implications for cost and probability’s status as treatment
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mechanisms. Recall Kraemer et al.’s second step in establishing mediation in an RCT (treatment must be
related to the proposed mediator). Though the significant Group x Time interaction shows that com‐
pared to WL, treatment was indeed associated with greater reductions in cost and probability estimates,
this association would be strengthened if follow‐up analyses had not revealed that these measures also
changed significantly in the absence of treatment. The developers of the OPQ and OCQ (Uren et al.,
2004) report high internal consistency for both measures (consistent with the present study), and results
of an initial principal axis factor analysis support the construct validity of these questionnaires. However,
no studies published to date have examined the test‐retest reliability of either the OCQ or the OPQ.
Thus future research is needed on the psychometric properties of these measures.
Second, treatment‐related improvement on the outcome measure, though statistically signifi‐
cant, was modest. As all participants in the current study identified public speaking as their most feared
social situation, exposure in our treatment protocol focused almost exclusively on public speaking exer‐
cises, which may have resulted in smaller change scores on the BFNE (a measure of broader evaluative
concerns). Future studies should clarify whether the nature of the relationship between the modifica‐
tion of judgmental biases and social anxiety symptom reduction observed in the present study general‐
izes across participants with a range of social performance and interaction fears. Relatedly, the rate of
comorbidity in the current sample (22%) is lower than what is typically found for individuals with social
phobia. Despite lower levels of comorbidity, participants’ self‐report of social anxiety symptoms was
elevated as compared with nonclinical samples (Duke, Krishnan, Faith, & Storch, 2006). Our sample was
also atypical in that our participants were more highly educated than the population at large, which may
have positively impacted their ability to understand the concept of judgmental biases and to recognize
distorted cognitions as they occurred. Thus it is unknown the extent to which our findings would gener‐
alize to other more highly comorbid or less well‐educated populations.
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Third, the majority of studies which have examined judgmental biases in social phobia, including
the present study, have relied exclusively on forced‐choice self‐report measures to assess probability
and cost estimates as they pertain to hypothetical events. This represents a limitation of the literature,
as designs are strengthened when multiple modes of assessment (e.g., behavioral, observer‐report, and
clinician‐rated measures) are utilized (Weiner, Graham, & Naglieri, 2012). Future research on judgmen‐
tal biases should employ more open‐ended, qualitative, and behavioral methods of assessing these con‐
structs.
A final limitation of the present study is that cost and probability were examined separately as
predictors and not entered into the structural equation model simultaneously. Thus this design did not
allow for tests of whether one type of judgmental bias was a significantly better predictor of treatment
outcome than the other. As such, evidence regarding the relative importance of probability and cost
biases in social phobia treatment remains mixed, and the question of which is comparatively more im‐
portant unanswered. More research would be needed to establish whether one is a significantly greater
predictor of treatment outcome than the other. Furthermore, this study did not test competing third
variables as alternative treatment mechanisms (e.g., working alliance, treatment expectancy, anxiety
sensitivity). Cost and probability’s statuses as treatment mechanisms would be strengthened by model‐
ing multiple potential mechanisms simultaneously, including plausible rival mechanisms, and parceling
out the effects of each. This objective could also be achieved with research that systematically examines
the effects of cost‐specific versus probability‐specific interventions to see if one condition demonstrates
superiority.
In all likelihood, however, both cost and probability biases contribute significantly to treatment
outcome. Evidence suggests that both function as treatment mechanisms, and elements of both are
needed to create threat appraisals. That is, without the perception of negative consequences, an ex‐
tremely likely event would not create fear, and without the possibility (likelihood) of an event occurring,

59
a catastrophic consequence would not create fear. Practicing clinicians should therefore continue to
routinely assess and target both probability and cost biases in treatment. This recommendation is in line
that of researchers (e.g., Wells, 1997; Antony & Swinson, 2008) who advocate for the use of behavioral
experiments in which, following exposures that test the probability of negative social events (in which
clients ideally learn that feared outcomes are not as probable as they had anticipated), clients should
complete exercises in which they purposely commit social errors. For example, if an individual fears her
hand will tremble during a presentation, she should first complete an exposure in which she attempts to
give her presentation as competently as possible, followed by an additional exposure in which she pur‐
posely allows her hand to tremble. The dual nature of this approach allows individuals to learn that, not
only are feared outcomes unlikely, even if such outcomes do occur, the consequences are not as cata‐
strophic as imagined.
Though not a limitation per se, there is another aspect of the current project that should be not‐
ed. Both treatments delivered in this study specifically targeted cost and probability biases; however,
they did so using different interventions and at different points in treatment. The VRE group received
psychoeducation and cognitive restructuring that explicitly targeted these biases prior to the midtreat‐
ment assessment but did not begin exposure exercises until after the midtreatment assessment (in Ses‐
sion 5). The EGT group also received psychoeducation regarding these biases but no cognitive restruc‐
turing (e.g., ABC sheets); rather, the EGT group used cognitive preparations to specifically address these
biases. Also, their exposure began prior to the midtreatment assessment. Thus this study was not de‐
signed to determine which components of treatment (psychoeducation, cognitive restructuring, cogni‐
tive preparation, exposure, or social mishap exercises) modified these biases. It is possible that, for the
EGT group, these biases were modified solely through exposure, as exposure would have, in theory, led
to new information about the probability and cost of harm associated with feared stimuli being incorpo‐
rated into the fear structure.
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This possibility is interesting in light of the current debate as to whether adding cognitive inter‐
ventions improves outcomes relative to exposure‐alone treatment (e.g., Longmore & Worrell, 2007). For
example, in the depression literature, a substantial number of studies have demonstrated that strictly
behavioral interventions (e.g., Behavioral Activation; Jacobson, Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001, Martell, Ad‐
dis, & Jacobson, 2001) are as effective as interventions that include both cognitive and behavioral com‐
ponents. Dismantling studies such as these have been cited by Acceptance and Commitment theorists to
challenge the commonly held notion that modifying distorting cognitions (versus accepting them, defus‐
ing from them, and changing one’s relationship to them) should be a primary goal of treatment (e.g.,
Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes, 2004). Within the social phobia literature, however, the findings of disman‐
tling studies present an unclear picture. Whereas early studies (Butler, Cullington, Munby, Amies, &
Gelder, 1984; Mattick & Peters, 1988; Mattick, Peters, & Clarke, 1989) found that the effects of CBT ex‐
ceeded those of exposure alone, Hope, Heimberg, & Bruch (1995) found that exposure alone was at
least as effective as exposure plus cognitive intervention. Moreover, the results of several meta‐analyses
have shown that, though the effect sizes of CBT for social phobia are large, they do not exceed those of
exposure alone (Fedoroff & Taylor, 2001; Feske & Chambless, 1995; Gould, Buckminster, Pollack, Otto &
Yap, 1997; Powers, Sigmarsson, & Emmelkamp, 2008). Hofmann (2004) compared CBGT and EGT with‐
out explicit cognitive intervention and found that the two treatments did not differ significantly from
one another at posttreatment; however, only participants who received CBGT showed continued im‐
provement in the follow‐up period, suggesting that cognitive interventions led to better maintenance of
treatment gains.
Though the present study supports the centrality of cost and probability biases to treatment
outcome, it does not necessarily contradict the above‐referenced dismantling studies that have chal‐
lenged the utility of explicit cognitive intervention. Were the findings of the present study to be repli‐
cated in the VRE treatment group only (which did not start exposure until after the midtreatment as‐
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sessment), they would provide stronger evidence for the utility of explicitly targeting these biases with
cognitive interventions. Thus an additional area for future research is to determine how cost‐ and prob‐
ability‐focused interventions exert their effects. Research comparing probability‐ and cost‐focused cog‐
nitive interventions (e.g., cognitive restructuring, Socratic questioning, ABC worksheets) and probability‐
and cost‐focused exposure exercises (e.g., traditional exposure, social mishap exercises) may be illumi‐
native. In the absence of clarity on this issue, it would seem prudent for practicing clinicians to continue
to place strong emphasis on assessing and modifying clients’ judgmental biases through both explicit
cognitive interventions and exposure.
In conclusion, theoretical models of social phobia posit that biased attention allocation may be
related to judgmental biases. Though the empirical literature on the relation between attention bias and
cost and probability biases is in its infancy, findings of the present study point to a potentially productive
area of new research. However, preliminary steps are much needed before the relations between atten‐
tional and judgmental processes can be further delineated.
There is considerably more empirical support for the relation between judgmental biases and
treatment outcome for social phobia. Several recent studies have yielded results consistent with the
cognitive mediation hypothesis, which states that treatments for social phobia exert their effects
through the modification of judgmental biases regarding the cost and probability of negative social
events. The results of the present study extend and clarify the findings of previous investigations by add‐
ing to our knowledge about how changes in judgmental biases and social anxiety symptoms unfold over
time. Our design and analytic approach have contributed to the scientific literature by yielding a more
rigorous and conservative test of changes in judgmental biases as mechanisms by which CBT results in
reduced social anxiety symptoms. Understanding the processes that account for therapeutic change is
crucial for enhancing treatment efficacy and maximizing improvements for clients. Though further re‐
search is needed to ascertain the nature of their relation with other cognitive processes, such as atten‐
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tion bias, and to solidify their status as treatment mechanisms, the present study, coupled with the ex‐
isting literature, suggests that these biases will likely be fruitful targets for further investigation.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Demographic Information
Gender:
O
Male
O
Female
Age: _________________
Date of Birth: _________________
Racial/Ethnic Origin:
O
African American
O
Caucasian
O
Hispanic
O
Asian American
O
Pacific Islander
O
American Indian
O
Other _____________________
Highest level of Education Completed:
O
Some high school
O
Completed high school
O
Some college (1‐2 years)
O
Some college (3+ years)
O
Completed college degree
O
Some graduate school
O
Completed graduate degree
Current Marital Status:
O
Single
O
Married
O
Separated
O
Divorced
O
Living with someone
O
Widowed
Current Total Annual Household Income:
O
Less than $ 5,000
O
$ 5,000 ‐ $ 10,000
O
$ 10,000 ‐ $ 20,000
O
$ 20,000 ‐ $ 30,000
O
$ 30,000 ‐ $ 50,000
O
More than $ 50,000
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Appendix B
BFNE
Read each of the following statements and then use the scale below to indicate the degree to which
each statement applies to you, use the blank to enter the number that corresponds to your answer for
each question.

1
Not at All

2
Slightly

3
Moderately

4
Very

5
Extremely

1. I worry about what other people will think of me even when I know that it doesn’t make
any difference. __________
2. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavorable opinion of me. ________
3. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my short comings. _______
4. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone. _______
5. I am afraid that others will not approve of me. ________
6. I am afraid that people will find fault in me. ________
7. Other people’s opinions of me do not bother me. _______
8. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be thinking about me. ______
9. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make. _______
10. If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me. ______
11. Sometime I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me. _______
12. I often worry that I will say or do wrong things. ________
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Appendix C
OPQ
Please rate how likely it is that the following outcomes will happen to you in a public speaking
situation within the next year. Use the “0‐8” scale below to indicate your answer, with “0” indicating
that the outcome listed is not at all likely and “8” indicating the outcome listed is extremely likely.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all likely

1. You will feel embarrassed by something you did
2. You will sound dumb while talking to others
3. You will feel flustered in front of others
4. People will think that you are boring
5. At a party, others will notice that you are nervous
6. During a job interview or evaluation, you will freeze
7. While you are talking with several people, one of them will leave
8. You will be ignored by someone you know
9. You will do something foolish in public
10. You will fail to accomplish an important goal
11. You will fail to cope in your day‐to‐day living
12. You will be unexpectedly called in to see your supervisor at work

7

8
Extremely likely
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Appendix D
OCQ
Please rate how bad or distressing the following outcomes would be for you if they were to oc‐
cur in a public speaking situation? Use the “0‐8” scale below to indicate your answer, with “0” indicating
that the outcome listed would be not at all distressing and “8” indicating the outcome listed would be
extremely distressing.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
distressing

1. You were embarrassed by something you did
2. You sounded dumb to others
3. You felt flustered in front of others
4. People thought that you were boring
5. At a party, others noticed that you were nervous
6. During a job interview or evaluation, you froze
7. While you were talking with several people, one of them left
8. You were ignored by someone you knew
9. You did something foolish in public
10. You failed to accomplish an important goal
11. You failed to cope in your day‐to‐day living
12. You were unexpectedly called in to see your supervisor at work

7

8
Extremely
distressing

